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Abstract. An optimal control problem is considered for a stochastic differential equation with the cost
functional determined by a backward stochastic Volterra integral equation (BSVIE, for short). This kind
of cost functional can cover the general discounting (including exponential and non-exponential) situation
with a recursive feature. It is known that such a problem is time-inconsistent in general. Therefore,
instead of finding a global optimal control, we look for a time-consistent locally near optimal equilibrium
strategy. With the idea of multi-person differential games, a family of approximate equilibrium strategies
is constructed associated with partitions of the time intervals. By sending the mesh size of the time
interval partition to zero, an equilibrium Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB, for short) equation is derived,
through which the equilibrium valued function and an equilibrium strategy are obtained. Under certain
conditions, a verification theorem is proved and the well-posedness of the equilibrium HJB is established.
As a sort of Feynman-Kac formula for the equilibrium HJB equation, a new class of BSVIEs (containing
the diagonal value Z(r, r) of Z(· , ·)) is naturally introduced and the well-posedness of such kind of
equations is briefly presented.
Keywords. time-inconsistent optimal control problem, backward stochastic Volterra integral equation,
stochastic differential games, equilibrium strategy, equilibrium Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation.
AMS subject classifications. 93E20, 49N70, 60H20, 35F21, 49L20, 90C39
1 Introduction
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space on which a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion W =
{W (t); 0 6 t <∞} is defined, and let F = {Ft}t>0 be the natural filtration of W (·) augmented by all the
P-null sets in F . Let T > 0. We denote
Xt ≡ L
2
Ft(Ω;R
n) =
{
ξ : Ω→ Rn | ξ is Ft-measurable, E|ξ|
2 <∞
}
, t ∈ [0, T ];
D =
{
(t, ξ) | t ∈ [0, T ), ξ ∈ Xt
}
; ∆[0, T ] ,
{
(t, s)
∣∣ 0 6 t 6 s 6 T}. (1.1)
For any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D , consider the following controlled (forward) stochastic differential equation
(SDE, or FSDE, for short) on the finite horizon [t, T ], in its integral form:
X(s) = ξ +
∫ s
t
b(r,X(r), u(r))dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,X(r), u(r))dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ], (1.2)
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where b : [0, T ] × Rn × U → Rn and σ : [0, T ] × Rn × U → Rn×d are given (deterministic) maps with
U ⊆ Rm being a nonempty set (which could be bounded or unbounded). In the above, u(·) is called a
control process, which belongs to the following set of admissible controls:
U [t, T ] =
{
u : [t, T ]× Ω→ U
∣∣ u(·) is F-progressively measurable, and E∫ T
t
|u(s)|2ds <∞
}
.
According to the standard results of SDEs, under appropriate conditions, for any (t, ξ) ∈ D and any
u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], equation (1.2) admits a unique (strong) solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, ξ, u(·)) which is referred
to as the state process corresponding to (t, ξ) and u(·). To measure the performance of the control u(·),
one could introduce the following cost functional:
J0(t, ξ;u(·)) = Et
[
e−λ(T−t)h0(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
e−λ(r−t)g0(r,X(r), u(r))dr
]
, (1.3)
for some suitable maps h0 : Rn → R, g0 : [0, T ] × Rn × U → R, and some parameter λ > 0, where
Et[ · ] = E[ · | Ft] is the conditional expectation operator. The two terms on the right-hand side of the
above are called the terminal cost and the running cost, respectively, and λ is called the discount rate.
Note that the terms e−λ(T−t) in the terminal cost and e−λ(r−t) in the running cost are exponential
functions with the same parameter λ. We therefore call (1.3) a cost functional with an exponential
discounting. With the state equation (1.2) and the cost functional (1.3), one could pose the following
classical stochastic optimal control problem.
Problem (C). For any (t, ξ) ∈ D , find a control u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] such that
J0(t, ξ; u¯(·)) = essinf
u(·)∈U [t,T ]
J0(t, ξ;u(·)) = V 0(t, ξ). (1.4)
Any u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] satisfying (1.4) is called an (open-loop) optimal control of Problem (C) for the
initial pair (t, ξ); the corresponding state process X¯(·) ≡ X(· ; t, ξ, u¯(·)) is called an (open-loop) optimal
state process; (X¯(·), u¯(·)) is called an (open-loop) optimal pair; and V 0(· , ·) : D → R is called the value
function of Problem (C).
It is known that (see, for example, [46]) if u¯(·) is an open-loop optimal control of Problem (C) for
the initial pair (t, ξ) with the corresponding optimal state process X¯(·) ≡ X¯(· ; t, ξ, u¯(·)), then for any
τ ∈ (t, T ],
J0(τ, X¯(τ); u¯(·)|[τ,T ]) = essinf
u(·)∈U [τ,T ]
J0(τ, X¯(τ);u(·)).
This means that the restriction u¯(·)|[τ,T ] of u¯(·) on [τ, T ] is an open-loop optimal control for the initial
pair (τ, X¯(τ)). Such a property is referred to as the time-consistency of the optimal control u¯(·), or the
time-consistency of Problem (C).
In 1992, Duffie and Epstein introduced stochastic differential utility process ([11, 12], see also [13]). We
prefer to call it a recursive utility/disutility process. The main feature of such a process Y (·) is that the
current value Y (t) depends on the future values Y (s), t < s 6 T of the process. Economically, this can be
explained as follows: Due to people’s optimism/pessimism, the predicted future utility/disutility affects
the current utility/disutility. For a classical optimal control problem (with exponential discounting), the
recursive utility/disutility process Y (·) of the state-control pair (X(·), u(·)) can usually be described by
the following equation:
Y (s) = Es
[
e−λ(T−s)h(X(T )) +
∫ T
s
e−λ(r−s)g(r,X(r), u(r), Y (r))dr
]
, s ∈ [t, T ]. (1.5)
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We refer the readers to [11, 13, 43] for more details. It is easy to see that Y (·) solves (1.5) if and only if
for some Z(·), the pair (Y (·), Z(·)) is an adapted solution to the following backward stochastic differential
equation (BSDE, for short):
Y (s) = h(X(T )) +
∫ T
s
[
λY (r) + g(r,X(r), u(r), Y (r))
]
dr −
∫ T
s
Z(r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ]. (1.6)
Inspired by this, we could introduce more general controlled decoupled forward-backward stochastic dif-
ferential equation (FBSDE, for short) whose integral form is as follows:
X(s) = ξ +
∫ s
t
b(r,X(r), u(r))dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,X(r), u(r))dW (r),
Y (s) = h(X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g(r,X(r), u(r), Y (r), Z(r))dr −
∫ T
s
Z(r)dW (r),
s ∈ [t, T ], (1.7)
with the cost functional, called a recursive cost functional, given by the following:
JR(t, ξ;u(·)) = Y (t). (1.8)
Then we may pose the following classical optimal recursive control problem.
Problem (R). For each (t, ξ) ∈ D , find a u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] such that
JR(t, ξ; u¯(·)) = essinf
u(·)∈U [t,T ]
JR(t, ξ;u(·)) ≡ V R(t, ξ). (1.9)
Similar to Problem (C), any u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] satisfies (1.9) is called an open-loop optimal control, etc.
It is interesting that Problem (R) is also time-consistent (see [43]).
The advantage of the time-consistency is that for any initial pair (t, ξ), if an optimal control u¯(·) is
constructed, then it will stay optimal thereafter (for the later initial pair (τ, X¯(τ)) along the optimal
state process). This is a little too ideal. In the real world, the time-consistency rarely exists. Instead,
most problems, if not all, people encountered are not time-consistent. In other words, an optimal con-
trol/policy found for the current initial pair (t, ξ) will hardly stay optimal as time goes by. Such a
situation is referred to as the time-inconsistency. An important reason leading to the time-inconsistency
is due to people’s subjective time-preferences. In fact, people usually over discount on the utility for the
outcome of immediate future events. Mathematically, such a situation could be described by the so-called
nonexponential discounting, meaning that the discounting terms e−λ(T−t) and e−λ(s−t) appearing in, say,
J0(t, ξ;u(·)) are replaced by some more general functions µ(T, t) and ν(s, t), respectively, so that the cost
functional J0(t, ξ;u(·)) becomes
J˜0(t, ξ;u(·)) = Et
[
µ(T, t)h0(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
ν(r, t)g0(r,X(r), u(r))dr
]
. (1.10)
Let us list some possible nonexponential discounting functions as follows:
(i) Hyperbolic discounting : µ(t, T ) = 11+λ1(T−t) , ν(t, r) =
1
1+λ2(r−t)
with λ1, λ2 > 0 and they could be
equal or different;
(ii) Heterogeneous discounting: µ(t, T ) = e−λ1(T−t), ν(t, r) = e−λ2(r−t) with λ1, λ2 > 0, λ1 6= λ2;
(iii) Convex combination of two exponential discounting : µ(t, T ) = αe−λ1(T−t) + (1 − α)e−λ2(T−t),
ν(t, r) = αe−λ1(r−t) + (1− α)e−λ2(r−t), with α ∈ (0, 1), λ1, λ2 > 0, λ1 6= λ2;
(iv) Quasi-exponential discounting: µ(t, T ) =
(
1 + α(T − t)
)
e−λ(T−t), ν(t, r) =
(
1 + α(r − t)
)
e−λ(r−t),
with α, λ > 0.
3
We refer the reader to [14, 16, 15, 26, 27] for some relevant results. Inspired by [46, 47, 48, 43], instead
of (1.10), one may consider the following more general cost functional
Ĵ(t, ξ;u(·)) = Et
[
h(t,X(T )) +
∫ T
t
g(t, r,X(r), u(r))dr
]
, (1.11)
which not only includes the cases with the discounting functions (i)–(iv) listed above, but also, of course,
includes the case of exponential discounting. It turns out that the optimal control problem with the state
equation (1.2) and the above cost functional Ĵ(t, ξ;u(·)) is time-inconsistent, in general. If we let
Ŷ (s) = Es
[
h(s,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g(s, r,X(r), u(r))dr
]
, s ∈ [t, T ], (1.12)
then for some Ẑ(· , ·), the pair (Ŷ (·), Ẑ(· , ·)) is the adapted solution to the following backward stochastic
Volterra integral equation (BSVIE, for short):
Ŷ (s) = h(s,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g(s, r,X(r), u(r))dr −
∫ T
s
Ẑ(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ], (1.13)
and
Ĵ(t, ξ;u(·)) = Ŷ (t).
Motivated by the above non-exponential discounting, together with the recursive utility/disutility,
it is then natural to introduce the following recursive cost functional with general (nonexponential)
discounting:
Y (s) = h(s,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g(s, r,X(r), u(r), Y (r), Z(s, r))dr −
∫ T
s
Z(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ], (1.14)
where g : ∆[0, T ]× Rn × U × R × R1×d → R and h : [0, T ] × Rn → R are suitable deterministic maps,
recalling (see (1.1))
∆[0, T ] = {(s, r) ∈ [0, T ]
∣∣ 0 6 s 6 r 6 T }.
In (1.14), g(·) and h(·) are called the generator and the free term, respectively, of the BSVIE. By the
standard results of BSVIE (see, [45, 34]), under some mild conditions, for any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D , any
control u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], and the corresponding state process X(·), equation (1.14) admits a unique adapted
solution (Y (·), Z(· , ·)) ≡ (Y ( · ; t, ξ, u(·)), Z(· , · ; t, ξ, u(·))), by which we mean an (R× R1×d)-valued ran-
dom field (Y, Z) = {(Y (s), Z(s, r)) : (s, r) ∈ ∆[t, T ]} such that Y (·) is F-progressively measurable on
[t, T ]; for each fixed s ∈ [t, T ], Z(s, ·) is F-progressively measurable on [s, T ]; equation (1.14) is satisfied
in the usual Itoˆ sense. Now, with the adapted solution (Y (·), Z(· , ·)) of BSVIE (1.14), depending on
(t, ξ, u(·)), we introduce the following cost functional:
J(t, ξ;u(·)) = Y (t). (1.15)
Thus, we are considering state equation (1.2) with the recursive cost functional (1.15) determined through
BSVIE (1.14). Then the corresponding optimal control problem can be stated as:
Problem (N). For each (t, ξ) ∈ D , find a u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] such that
J(t, ξ; u¯(·)) = essinf
u(·)∈U [t,T ]
J(t, ξ;u(·)) = V (t, ξ). (1.16)
Similar to before, any u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] satisfying (1.16) is called an (open-loop) optimal control of
Problem (N) for the initial pair (t, ξ); the corresponding state process X¯(·) ≡ X(· ; t, ξ, u¯(·)) is called an
(open-loop) optimal state process; (X¯(·), u¯(·)) is called an (open-loop) optimal pair; and V (·, ·) is called
the value function of Problem (N).
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We point out that Problem (N) is time-inconsistent, in general. Readers might notice that in [46, 43],
a similar problem was studied, where the (recursive) cost functional was described by a family of BSDEs.
In the last section, we will briefly present an argument to show that using BSVIEs seems to be more
natural than using BSDEs. Because of the time-inconsistency of the above Problem (N), people also refer
to the above optimal control u¯(·) as the pre-commitment optimal control.
Let us take this opportunity to briefly recall the history of BSVIEs. As an extension of BSDEs, a
BSVIE of form
Y (s) = ξ +
∫ T
s
g(s, r, Y (r), Z(s, r))dr −
∫ T
s
Z(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [0, T ], (1.17)
(where Y (·) could be higher dimensional) was firstly studied by Lin [23], followed by several other re-
searchers: Aman and N’Zi [2], Wang and Zhang [42], Djordjevic´ and Jankovic´ [9, 10], Hu and Øksendal
[17], etc. Inspired by the study of optimal control problems for forward stochastic Volterra integral
equations (FSVIEs, for short), Yong [45] introduced more general BSVIEs, together with the notion of
adapted M-solution. There are quite a few follow-up works. Let us mention some: Anh–Grecksch–Yong
[3] investigated BSVIEs in Hilbert spaces; Shi–Wang–Yong [33] studied the well-posedness of BSVIEs
containing expectation (of the unknowns); Ren [32] discussed BSVIEs with jumps; Wang–Sun–Yong [36]
studied BSVIE with quadratic growth (in Z); Wang–Yong [40] obtained a representation of the adapted
(M-)solution for a class of BSVIEs via the so-called representation partial differential equations; Overbeck
and Ro¨der [29] even developed a theory of path-dependent BSVIEs; Numerical aspect was considered by
Bender–Pokalyuk [4]; relevant optimal control problems were studied by Shi–Wang–Yong [34], Agram–
Øksendal [1], Wang–Zhang [41], and Wang [38]; Wang–Yong [39] established various comparison theorems
for both adapted solutions and adapted M-solutions to BSVIEs in multi-dimensional Euclidean spaces.
For the state equation (1.2) together with the recursive cost functional J(t, ξ;u(·)) defined by (1.15)
through the BSVIE (1.14), Problem (N) is expected to be time-inconsistent. Therefore, finding an optimal
control at any given initial pair (t, ξ) is not very useful. Instead, one should find an equilibrium strategy
which is time-consistent and possesses certain kind of local optimality. To find such a strategy, we adopt
the method of multi-person differential games. The idea can be at least traced back to the work of Pollak
[31] in 1968. Later, the approach was adopted and further developed by Ekeland–Lazrak [14, 15]; Yong
[46, 47, 48]; Bjo¨rk–Murgoci [6]; Bjo¨rk–Murgoci–Zhou [7]; Bjo¨rk–Khapko–Murgoci [5]; Wei–Yong–Yu [43],
Mei–Yong [28], and Yan–Yong [44] for various kinds of problems.
Let us now recall the approach of [46], which leads to our current approach. For any τ ∈ [0, T ), we
first divide the time interval [τ, T ] into N subintervals: [t0, t1), [t1, t2), ..., [tN−1, tN ] with t0 = τ , tN = T ,
and introduce an N -person differential game, where players are labeled from 1 to N . Player k takes
over the system at t = tk−1 from Player (k − 1), controls the system on [tk−1, tk), and hands over to
Player (k+ 1). The initial pair (tk−1, X(tk−1)) of Player k is the terminal pair of Player (k− 1). All the
players know that each player tries to find an optimal control (in some sense) for his/her own problem
and each player will discount the future cost in his/her own way, even though this player is not controlling
the system later on. For Player k, using the representation of adapted solutions to the BSVIE by that
of FSDE, together with a presentation partial differential equation, the future cost on [tk, T ] will be
transformed to the terminal cost at t = tk; and with some suitable modification of BSVIE on [tk−1, tk],
a suitable recursive cost functional on [tk−1, tk] for Player k can be constructed. Then Player k faces a
time-consistent optimal control problem. Under proper conditions, an optimal control on [tk−1, tk] can
be determined. This leads to an approximate equilibrium strategy and the corresponding approximate
equilibrium value function of the game. Letting the mesh size ‖Π‖ tend to zero, we get the limits called
the equilibrium strategy and equilibrium value function of the original problem, respectively. At the same
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time, a so-called equilibrium Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation (equilibrium HJB equation, for short) is
also derived, which can be used to identify the time-consistent equilibrium value function. Under certain
conditions, the equilibrium strategy is locally optimal in a proper sense. When σ(·) is independent of the
control process u(·), under some mild conditions, we will show that the equilibrium HJB equation admits
a unique classical solution. Furthermore, inspired by the idea of decoupling FBSDEs and the nonlinear
Feynman–Kac formula, the (classical) solution of the equilibrium HJB equation can be represented by
the solution of a new type BSVIE in which the term Z(s, s) appears. Under certain conditions, a well-
posedness result of such an equation is established. As a consequence, the equilibrium strategy can be
expressed in terms of the solution to such a BSVIE.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present preliminary results which will
be useful in the sequel. In Section 3, by using the idea of multi-person differential games, a family of
approximate equilibrium strategies is constructed. By letting the mesh size tend to zero, the equilibrium
strategy and equilibrium value function are determined by the equilibrium HJB equation. A verification
theorem as well as a well-posedness result of the equilibrium HJB equation (for a special case) is obtained
in Section 4. In Section 5, a new kind of BSVIE (containing the diagonal values Z(s, s) of Z(· , ·)) is
introduced, which is motivated by finding a Feynman-Kac type formula for the equilibrium HJB equation.
Some concluding remarks are collected in Section 6, including a formal argument to show that BSVIE is a
more suitable way to represent a recursive cost functional with nonexponential discounting, a comparison
of equilibrium HJB equations resulted from two approaches, and some open questions concerning Problem
(N).
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, M⊤ stands for the transpose of a matrix M , tr (M) the trace of M , Rn×d
the Euclidean space consisting of (n × d) real matrices, endowed with the Frobenius inner product
〈M,N〉 7→ tr [M⊤N ]. Let U ⊆ Rm be a nonempty set which could be bounded or unbounded and Sn be
the subspace of Rn×n consisting of symmetric matrices. We will use K > 0 to represent a generic constant
which could be different from line to line. Let T > 0 be a fixed time horizon and H (also H1, H2) be a
Euclidean space (which could be Rn, Rn×d, Sn, etc.). Recall ∆[0, T ] =
{
(t, s) ∈ [0, T ]2 | 0 6 t 6 s 6 T
}
as before. In the sequel, we will need various spaces of functions and processes, which we collect here
first for convenience:
L2Ft(Ω;H) =
{
ξ : Ω→ H
∣∣ ξ is Ft-measurable, E|ξ|2 <∞}, t ∈ [0, T ],
L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];H)) =
{
ϕ : [0, T ]× Ω→ H
∣∣ ϕ(·) F-adapted, t 7→ ϕ(t, ω) is continuous, a.s.ω ∈ Ω,
E
[
sup
06s6T
|ϕ(s)|2
]
<∞
}
,
CF([0, T ];L
2(Ω;H))=
{
ϕ : [0, T ]→L2FT (Ω;H)
∣∣ ϕ(·) is F-adapted, continuous, sup
06s6T
E
[
|ϕ(s)|2
]
<∞
}
,
L2
F
(∆[0, T ];H) =
{
ϕ :∆[0, T ]×Ω→H
∣∣ ϕ(t, ·) is F-progressively measurable on [t, T ], a.e. t∈ [0, T ],
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
∫ T
t
|ϕ(t, s)|2ds <∞
}
,
Ck(H1;H2) =
{
ϕ :H1 →H2
∣∣ ϕ(·) is j-th continuously differentiable for any 0 6 j 6 k },
Ckb (H1;H2) =
{
ϕ :H1 →H2
∣∣ ϕ(·) ∈ Ck(H1;H2), the j-th derivatives are bounded, 0 6 j 6 k}.
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For convenience, we rewrite the state equation and the recursive cost functional below:
X(s) = ξ +
∫ s
t
b(r,X(r), u(r))dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,X(r), u(r))dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ], (2.1)
Y (s) = h(s,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g(s, r,X(r), u(r), Y (r), Z(s, r))dr −
∫ T
s
Z(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ], (2.2)
and
J(t, ξ;u(·)) = Y (t). (2.3)
To guarantee the well-posedness of the controlled SDE (2.1) and BSVIE (2.2), we adopt the following
assumptions:
(H1) Let the maps b : [0, T ]× Rn × U → Rn and σ : [0, T ]× Rn × U → Rn×d be continuous. There
exists a constant L > 0 such that
|b(s, x1, u)− b(s, x2, u)|+ |σ(s, x1, u)− σ(s, x2, u)| 6 L|x1 − x2|, ∀ (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]× U, x1, x2 ∈ R
n,
|b(s, 0, u)|+ |σ(s, 0, u)| 6 L(1 + |u|), ∀ (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]× U.
(H2) Let the maps g : ∆[0, T ]× Rn × U × R × R1×d → R and h : [0, T ] × Rn → R be continuous.
There exists a constant L > 0 such that
|g(t1, s, x1, u, y1, z1)− g(t2, s, x2, u, y2, z2)|+ |h(t1, x1)− h(t2, x2)|
6 L
(
|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2|+ |y1 − y2|+ |z1 − z2|
)
,
∀ (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]× U, t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ], x1, x2 ∈ R
n, y1, y2 ∈ R, z1, z2 ∈ R
1×d,
|g(0, s, 0, u, 0, 0)|+ |h(0, 0)| 6 L(1 + |u|), ∀ (s, u) ∈ [0, T ]× U.
The following results, whose proofs are standard (see [50] and [45, 34]), present the well-posedness of
SDE (2.1) and BSVIE (2.2) under (H1)–(H2).
Lemma 2.1. Let (H1) hold. Then for any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D and control u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], the state
equation (2.1) admits a unique solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, ξ, u(·)) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;C([t, T ];Rn)). Moreover, there
exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ξ) and u(·), such that
Et
(
sup
t6s6T
|X(s)|2
)
6 KEt
(
1 + |ξ|2 +
∫ T
t
|u(r)|2dr
)
. (2.4)
In addition, if (H2) also holds, then for any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D , control u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], and
the corresponding state process X(·), BSVIE (2.2) admits a unique adapted solution (Y (·), Z(·, ·)) ≡
(Y (· ; t, ξ, u(·)), Z(·, · ; t, ξ, u(·))) ∈ C([t, T ];L2
F
(Ω;R)) × L2
F
(∆[t, T ];R1×d). Moreover, there exists a con-
stant K > 0, independent of (t, ξ) and u(·), such that
sup
t6s6T
Et
(
|Y (s)|2 +
∫ T
s
|Z(s, r)|2dr
)
6 KEt
(
1 + |ξ|2 +
∫ T
t
|u(r)|2dr
)
. (2.5)
We now present a result concerning a certain type modified BSVIEs, which will play a crucial role in
our subsequent analysis. For any (t, ξ) ∈ D and u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], let (X(·), Y (·), Z(· , ·)) be the adapted
solution to (2.1)–(2.2). For any small ε > 0, consider the following BSVIE:
Yε(s) = hε(s,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
gε(s, r,X(r), u(r), Yε(r), Zε(s, r))dr −
∫ T
s
Zε(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ], (2.6)
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which is referred to as a modified BSVIE, where{
hε(s, x) = h(t, x)1[t,t+ε](s) + h(s, x)1(t+ε,T ](s),
gε(s, r, x, u, y, z) = g(t, r, x, u, y, z)1[t,t+ε](s) + g(s, r, x, u, y, z)1(t+ε,T ](s).
This is a natural approximation of the original BSVIE (2.2), in which the generator and the free term
have been modified for s ∈ [t, t+ ε] only. By Lemma 2.1, under (H1)–(H2), BSVIE (2.6) admits a unique
adapted solution (Yε(·), Zε(·, ·)). By the stability of adapted solutions to BSVIEs, we have
sup
s∈[t,T ]
Et
(
|Yε(s)− Y (s)|
2 +
∫ T
s
|Zε(s, r) − Z(s, r)|
2dr
)
6 K sup
s∈[t,T ]
Et
[
|hε(s,X(T ))− h(s,X(T ))|
2
+
∫ T
s
∣∣gε(s, r,X(r), u(r), Y (r), Z(s, r)) − g(s, r,X(r), u(r), Y (r), Z(s, r))∣∣2dr]
6 K
{
sup
s∈[t,t+ε]
Et
[
|h(t,X(T ))− h(s,X(T ))|2
+
∫ T
s
∣∣g(t, r,X(r), u(r), Y (r), Z(s, r)) − g(s, r,X(r), u(r), Y (r), Z(s, r))∣∣2dr]} 6 Kε2,
(2.7)
hereafter K > 0 is a generic constant which could be different from line to line. In particular,
|Yε(t)− Y (t)| 6 Kε. (2.8)
In our later discussion, we will need a little better than the above. Thus, some more delicate analysis is
needed. We now present the following result which gives a representation of (Yε(·), Zε(· , ·)) in terms of
(X(·), Y (·), Z(·, ·)) and a better estimate than (2.8).
Proposition 2.2. Let (H1)–(H2) hold. Let (t, ξ) ∈ D , u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], and (X(·), Y (·), Z(· , ·)) be the
adapted solution of (2.1)–(2.2). For ε ∈ (0, T − t], let (Yε(·), Zε(· , ·)) be the adapted solution of (2.6).
Then {
Yε(s) = Y (s), t+ ε < s 6 T,
Zε(s, r) = Z(s, r), t+ ε < s 6 r 6 T,
(2.9)
and {
Yε(r) = Y˜ (r), t 6 r 6 t+ ε,
Zε(s, r) = Z˜(r), t 6 s 6 t+ ε, s 6 r 6 T,
(2.10)
with (Y˜ (·), Z˜(·)) being the adapted solution of the following BSDE:
Y˜ (s) = h(t,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
(
g
(
t, r,X(r), u(r), Y (r), Z˜(r)
)
1[t+ε,T ](r)
+g
(
t, r,X(r), u(r), Y˜ (r), Z˜(r)
)
1[t,t+ε](r)
)
dr −
∫ T
s
Z˜(r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ].
(2.11)
Moreover, there exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ξ, u(·)), such that
|Yε(t)− Y (t)| 6 Kε
2, a.s. (2.12)
Proof. First of all, for s ∈ [t + ε, T ], BSVIEs (2.6) and (2.2) are identical. Thus, by the uniqueness
of adapted solutions to BSVIEs, we have (2.9). Next, for the given (X(·), u(·)), we denote (suppressing
X(·) and u(·), for notational simplicity)
h(s) = h(s,X(T )), g(s, r, y, z) = g(s, r,X(r), u(r), y, z),
hε(s) = hε(s,X(T )), gε(s, r, y, z) = gε(s, r,X(r), u(r), y, z).
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To get (2.10), we let (y(s, ·), z(s, ·)) and (yε(s, ·), zε(s, ·)) be the adapted solutions to the following BSDEs
parameterized by s ∈ [t, T ], respectively:
y(s, τ) = h(s) +
∫ T
τ
g(s, r, Y (r), z(s, r))dr −
∫ T
τ
z(s, r)dW (r), τ ∈ [s, T ], (2.13)
and
yε(s, τ) = hε(s) +
∫ T
τ
gε(s, r, Yε(r), zε(s, r))dr −
∫ T
τ
zε(s, r)dW (r), τ ∈ [s, T ]. (2.14)
Note that Y (·) and Yε(·) appeared on the right-hand sides are known. Setting τ = s in (2.14), we have
yε(s, s) = hε(s) +
∫ T
s
gε(s, r, Yε(r), zε(s, r))dr −
∫ T
s
zε(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ], (2.15)
Regarding (2.6) (suppressing X(·) and u(·)) as a BSVIE with generator (s, r, y, z) 7→ g(s, r, Yε(r), z)
(independent of y), we see that BSVIEs (2.15) and (2.6) are identical. Hence, by uniqueness of adapted
solutions to BSVIEs, one has
yε(s, s) = Yε(s), zε(s, r) = Zε(s, r), t 6 s 6 r 6 T. (2.16)
Similarly,
y(s, s) = Y (s), z(s, r) = Z(s, r), t 6 s 6 r 6 T. (2.17)
Next, for s ∈ [t, t+ ε], (2.14) reads
yε(s, τ) = h(t) +
∫ T
τ
g(t, r, Yε(r), zε(s, r))dr −
∫ T
τ
zε(s, r)dW (r), τ ∈ [s, T ], (2.18)
which is a BSDE on [s, T ] with the generator and terminal term independent of s ∈ [t, t+ ε]. Therefore,
yε(s, τ) = yε(τ), zε(s, τ) = zε(τ), s ∈ [t, t+ ε], τ ∈ [s, T ]. (2.19)
Combining (2.16) and (2.19), we further have that
zε(τ) = zε(s, τ) = Zε(s, τ) ≡ Zε(τ), s ∈ [t, t+ ε], τ ∈ [s, T ], (2.20)
i.e., in the current case, Zε(s, τ) is independent of s and can be denoted by Zε(τ). Clearly, (yε(·), zε(·))
satisfies (pick s = t in (2.18)) the following BSDE on [t, T ]:
yε(τ) = h(t) +
∫ T
τ
g(t, r, Yε(r), zε(r))dr −
∫ T
τ
zε(r)dW (r), τ ∈ [t, T ], (2.21)
Comparing (2.21) with the following (taking s = t in (2.13))
y(t, τ) = h(t) +
∫ T
τ
g(t, r, Y (r), z(t, r))dr −
∫ T
τ
z(t, r)dW (r), τ ∈ [t, T ], (2.22)
making use of the fact that (see (2.9)) Yε(r) = Y (r) for r ∈ [t+ε, T ], we see that the above BSDEs (2.21)
and (2.22) are identical for τ ∈ [t+ ε, T ]. Hence,
yε(τ) = y(t, τ) ≡ y(τ), zε(τ) = z(t, τ) ≡ z(τ), τ ∈ [t+ ε, T ]. (2.23)
Namely, for τ ∈ [t+ ε, T ], (yε(τ), zε(τ)) is independent of ε > 0 and (y(t, τ), z(t, τ)) is independent of t.
Thus, both can be denoted by (y(τ), z(τ)). Combining with (2.20) and (2.23), one has
z(τ) = Zε(τ), τ ∈ [t+ ε, T ]. (2.24)
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Also, taking τ = t+ ε in (2.21), we have (noting (2.23))
y(t+ ε) = h(t) +
∫ T
t+ε
g(t, r, Y (r), z(r))dr −
∫ T
t+ε
z(r)dW (r),
which is Ft+ε-measurable, as (yε(·), zε(·)) = (y(·), z(·)) solves BSDE (2.21) on [t + ε, T ]. Hence, (still
remember that s ∈ [t, t+ ε] so that (2.20), (2.23) and (2.24) hold) (2.6) becomes
Yε(s) = h(t) +
∫ T
t+ε
g(t, r, Yε(r), Zε(s, r))dr −
∫ T
t+ε
Zε(s, r)dW (r)
+
∫ t+ε
s
g(t, r, Yε(r), Zε(s, r))dr −
∫ t+ε
s
Zε(s, r)dW (r)
= h(t) +
∫ T
t+ε
g(t, r, Y (r), z(r))dr −
∫ T
t+ε
z(r)dW (r)
+
∫ t+ε
s
g(t, r, Yε(r), Zε(r))dr −
∫ t+ε
s
Zε(r)dW (r)
= y(t+ ε) +
∫ t+ε
s
g(t, r, Yε(r), Zε(r))dr −
∫ t+ε
s
Zε(r)dW (r),
(2.25)
which is a BSDE on [t, t+ ε], since y(t+ ε) is Ft+ε-measurable. Also, for fixed t, from (2.13), one has the
following:
y(t, s) = y(t+ ε) +
∫ t+ε
s
g(t, r, Y (r), z(t, r))dr −
∫ t+ε
s
z(t, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, t+ ε]. (2.26)
We now have two BSDEs (2.25) and (2.26) on [t, t+ ε] which have the same terminal value y(t+ ε), and
with different generators g(t, · , Yε(·), z) and g(t, · , Y (·), z). Hence, by the stability estimate of BSDE and
(2.7), we have
Et
[
sup
s∈[t,t+ε]
|y(t, s)− Yε(s)|
2 +
∫ t+ε
t
|z(t, r)− Zε(r)|
2dr
]
6 KEt
(∫ t+ε
t
|g(t, r, Y (r), Zε(r)) − g(t, r, Yε(r), Zε(r))|dr
)2
6 KEt
(∫ t+ε
t
|Y (r) − Yε(r)|dr
)2
6 KεEt
( ∫ t+ε
t
|Y (r) − Yε(r)|
2dr
)
6 Kε4.
Consequently,
|Yε(t)− Y (t)|
2 = |Yε(t)− y(t, t)|
2 6 sup
s∈[t,T ]
Et
[
|Yε(s)− y(t, s)|
2
]
6 Kε4, a.s.,
which proves the estimate (2.12). Finally, from (2.25) and (2.13), together with (2.24), for s ∈ [t, t+ ε],
one has
Yε(s) = h(t) +
∫ T
t+ε
g(t, r, Y (r), z(r))dr −
∫ T
t+ε
z(r)dW (r)
+
∫ t+ε
s
g(t, r, Yε(r), Zε(r))dr −
∫ t+ε
s
Zε(r)dW (r)
= h(t) +
∫ T
t+ε
g(t, r, Y (r), Zε(r))dr −
∫ T
t+ε
Zε(r)dW (r)
+
∫ t+ε
s
g(t, r, Yε(r), Zε(r))dr −
∫ t+ε
s
Zε(r)dW (r).
(2.27)
Hence, if (Y˜ (·), Z˜(·)) is the adapted solution of (2.11), then (2.10) holds.
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Next, let us consider the following system of decoupled FSDEs and BSVIE:
X(s) = ξ +
∫ s
t
b(r,X(r))dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,X(r))dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ],
Y (s) = h(s,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g(s, r,X(r), Y (r), Z(s, r))dr −
∫ T
s
Z(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ],
(2.28)
where (t, ξ) ∈ D . For the maps b, σ, g, h in the above, we assume that the corresponding (H1)–(H2)
(ignoring u(·)) hold, by Lemma 2.1, system (2.28) admits a unique adapted solution (X(·), Y (·), Z(· , ·)).
Further, we have the following representation (whose proof can be found in [40]).
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that Θ(·, ·, ·) ∈ C0,1,2(∆[0, T ] × Rn;R) is a classical solution to the fol-
lowing PDE:{
Θs(t, s, x) +H
0(t, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(t, s, x),Θxx(t, s, x)) = 0, (t, s, x) ∈ ∆[0, T ]× R
n,
Θ(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
(2.29)
where
H
0(t, s, x, θ, p, P ) =
1
2
tr
[
Pσ(s, x)σ(s, x)⊤
]
+ pb(s, x) + g(t, s, x, θ, pσ(s, x)),
(t, s, x, θ, p, P ) ∈ ∆[0, T ]× Rn × R× R1×n × Sn.
For any (t, ξ) ∈ D , suppose equation (2.28) admits a unique adapted solution (X(·), Y (·), Z(· , ·)) ≡
(X(· ; t, ξ), Y (· ; t, ξ), Z(· , · ; t, ξ)), then
Y (s) = Θ(s, s,X(s)), Z(s, r) = Θx(s, r,X(r))σ(r,X(r)), (s, r) ∈ ∆[t, T ], a.s. (2.30)
As a convention here and below, for any differentiable function ϕ : Rn → R the gradient ϕx : Rn →
R
1×n is a row vector valued function. From the above, we see that when r 7→ Θx(s, r, x) is continuous,
r 7→ Z(s, r) is continuous.
Remark 2.4. When
g(s, r, x, y, z) ≡ g(r, x, y, z), h(s, x) ≡ h(x), (2.31)
equation (2.28) becomes a decoupled FBSDE. Then Proposition 2.3 turns into a representation theorem
of the adapted solution to the corresponding FBSDE.
To conclude this section, let us recall a result for Problem (R). The corresponding HJB equation readsV
R
s (s, x) + inf
u∈U
H
R
(
s, x, u, V R(s, x), V Rx (s, x), V
R
xx(s, x)
)
= 0, (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
V R(T, x) = h(x), x ∈ Rn,
(2.32)
with
H
R(s, x, u, y, p, P ) =
1
2
tr
(
Pσ(s, x, u)σ(s, x, u)⊤
)
+ pb(s, x, u) + g
(
s, x, u, y, pσ(s, x, u)
)
,
(s, x, u, y, p, P ) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × U × R× R1×n × Sn.
The following result is a standard verification theorem of Problem (R). One is referred to Wei–Yong–
Yu [43] for a proof of this result.
Proposition 2.5. Let (H1)–(H2) hold with g and h being of form (2.31). Suppose that V R(·, ·) ∈
C1,2([0, T ]×Rn;R) is a classical solution of the HJB equation (2.32). Then for any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D ,
V R(t, ξ) 6 J(t, ξ;u(·)), a.s., ∀u(·) ∈ U [t, T ].
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Let (t, ξ) ∈ D be a given initial pair and (X¯(·), u¯(·)) be the corresponding state-control pair such that
u¯(s) ∈ argmin HR
(
s, X¯(s), · , V R(s, X¯(s)), V Rx (s, X¯(s)), V
R
xx(s, X¯(s))
)
, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ],
then
V R(t, ξ) = J(t, ξ; u¯(·)), a.s.
In another word, V R(· , ·) is the value function of Problem (R) and (X¯(·), u¯(·)) is an optimal pair of
Problem (R) for the initial pair (t, ξ).
3 Feedback Strategy and Equilibrium Strategy
Since Problem (N) is time-inconsistent, instead of looking for an optimal control, we should find a so-
called time-consistent equilibrium strategy for it, which is time-consistent and is locally optimal in a
suitable sense. Inspired by the method of multi-person differential games developed in [46], we will
introduce approximate equilibrium strategies associated with partitions of time intervals, together with
their constructions, and investigate the limit as the mesh size of the partition tends to zero. To this end,
let us first introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.1. Let τ ∈ [0, T ). A map Ψ : [τ, T ] × Rn → U is called a feedback strategy (of state
equation (1.2)) on [τ, T ] if for every t ∈ [τ, T ] and ξ ∈ Xt, the following closed-loop system:
X(s) = ξ +
∫ s
t
b
(
s,X(s),Ψ(s,X(s))
)
ds+
∫ s
t
σ
(
s,X(s),Ψ(s,X(s))
)
dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ], (3.1)
admits a unique solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, ξ,Ψ(· , ·)) ≡ XΨ(·).
Under (H2), for a given feedback strategy Ψ(· , ·), the following BSVIE:
Y (s) = h(s,XΨ(T )) +
∫ T
s
g(s, r,XΨ(r),Ψ(r,XΨ(r)), Y (r), Z(s, r))ds
−
∫ T
s
Z(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ]
(3.2)
admits a unique adapted solution (Y (·), Z(· , ·)) ≡ (Y Ψ(·), ZΨ(· , ·)). Therefore, the corresponding recur-
sive cost functional at (t, ξ) is well-defined:
J(t, ξ; Ψ(· , ·)) = Y Ψ(t). (3.3)
In this case, the outcome u(·) of Ψ(· , ·), called a closed-loop control, given by the following
u(s) = Ψ(s,XΨ(s)), s ∈ [t, T ],
is time-consistent. Moreover, by Proposition 2.3, if ΘΨ(·, ·, ·) ∈ C0,1,2(∆[τ, T ] × Rn;R) is a classical
solution to the following representation PDE (parameterized by t ∈ [τ, T ]):{
ΘΨs (t, s, x) +H
Ψ
(
t, s, x,ΘΨ(s, s, x),ΘΨx (t, s, x),Θ
Ψ
xx(t, s, x)
)
= 0, (t, s, x) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]× Rn,
ΘΨ(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn,
(3.4)
where
H
Ψ(t, s, x, θ, p, P ) =
1
2
tr
[
Pσ
(
s, x,Ψ(s, x)
)
σ
(
s, x,Ψ(s, x)
)⊤]
+ pb
(
s, x,Ψ(s, x)
)
+g
(
t, s, x,Ψ(s, x), θ, pσ(s, x,Ψ(s, x))
)
,
(t, s, x, θ, p, P ) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]× Rn × R× R1×n × Sn,
12
then (Y Ψ(·), ZΨ(· , ·)) admits the following representation:{
Y Ψ(s) = ΘΨ(s, s,XΨ(s)), s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.,
ZΨ(s, r) = ΘΨx (s, r,X
Ψ(r))σ
(
r,XΨ(r),Ψ(r,XΨ(r))
)
, (s, r) ∈ ∆[t, T ], a.s.,
(3.5)
with XΨ(·) being the solution of (3.1).
Next, we introduce the following notion, which combines the time-consistency and the local optimality.
Definition 3.2. A feedback strategy Ψ : [τ, T ]× Rn → U (of system (1.2)) is called an equilibrium
strategy on [τ, T ] if for any t ∈ [τ, T ), ξ ∈ Xt, and ε > 0 small with t + ε 6 T , there exists a family of
feedback strategies Ψε : [t, T ]× Rn → U such that
Ψε(s, x) = Ψ(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [t+ ε, T ]× Rn,
lim
ε→0
sup
s∈[t,t+ε),|x|6M
|Ψε(s, x) −Ψ(s, x)| = 0, ∀M > 0,
(3.6)
and
J(t, ξ; Ψε) 6 J
(
t, ξ;u⊕Ψ|[t+ε,T ]
)
+ o(ε), ∀u(·) ∈ U [t, t+ ε], (3.7)
where o(ε) is uniform in u(·) ∈ U [t, t+ ε] and
(
u⊕Ψ|[t+ε,T ]
)
(s) =
{
u(s), s ∈ [t, t+ ε),
Ψ(s,XΨ(s)), s ∈ [t+ ε, T ].
(3.8)
From (3.7), we see that the family {Ψε(· , ·)}ε>0 satisfies the following:
J(t, ξ; Ψε) 6 inf
u(·)∈U [t,t+ε]
J
(
t, ξ;u⊕Ψ|[t+ε,T ]
)
+ o(ε), (3.9)
which can be referred to as the local near-optimality of the family {Ψε(· , ·)}ε>0 at (t, ξ) (see [51] for the
notion of near-optimality, for standard time-consistent problems). Further, if the following holds
sup
s∈[t,t+ε),|x|6M
|Ψε(t, x)−Ψ(t, x)| = o(ε), ∀M > 0,
then (3.9) leads to
J
(
t, ξ; Ψ
∣∣
[t,T ]
)
6 inf
u(·)∈U [t,t+ε]
J
(
t, ξ;u⊕Ψ|[t+ε,T ]
)
+ o(ε), (3.10)
which can be referred to as the local near-optimality of Ψ(· , ·) itself (instead of the family {Ψε(· , ·)}ε>0).
To construct equilibrium strategies, we need to make some preparations. First, we set
H(t, s, x, u, θ, p, P ) =
1
2
tr
[
Pσ(s, x, u)σ(s, x, u)⊤
]
+ pb(s, x, u) + g
(
t, s, x, u, θ, pσ(s, x, u)
)
,
(t, s, x, u, θ, p, P ) ∈ ∆[0, T ]× Rn × U × R× R1×n × Sn.
(3.11)
The infimum (or minimum) of the map u 7→H(t, s, x, u, θ, p, P ) will be needed below. However, this map
may not be bounded below in general; even if it is bounded below, the infimum might not be achieved;
and even if the minimum exists (in the case, say, U is compact), the minimum might not be unique and
might not have needed regularity properties. To avoid all these inconvenient situations which are not our
main concern in this paper, similar to [46], we introduce the following technical assumption, which, as
mentioned in [46], is satisfied by some situations.
(H3) There is a continuous map ψ : ∆[0, T ]× Rn × R× R1×n × Sn → U such that
H
(
t, s, x, ψ(t, s, x, θ, p, P ), θ, p, P
)
= min
u∈U
H(t, s, x, u, θ, p, P ),
(t, s, x, θ, p, P ) ∈ ∆[0, T ]× Rn × R× R1×n × Sn,
(3.12)
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with the properties that the map
(t, s, x, θ, p, P ) 7→H
(
t, s, x, ψ(t, s, x, θ, p, P ), θ, p, P
)
is continuously differentiable having bounded derivatives in its arguments.
We admit that the above assumption is restrictive and maybe far more than enough. The problem
without the above (H3) is widely open. We prefer not to explore the minimization problem in (H3) here,
and leave it to our future investigations.
Now, let 0 6 τ < τ¯ < T and Ψ : [τ¯ , T ]×Rn → U be a feedback strategy on [τ¯ , T ]. We want to extend
Ψ(· , ·) to [τ, T ]× Rn by means of optimal controls. To this end, we formulate a time-consistent optimal
control problem on [τ, τ¯ ]. For any t ∈ [τ, τ¯ ], ξ ∈ Xt, and u(·) ∈ U [t, τ¯ ], we apply u(·) to the system on
[t, τ¯) followed by the feedback strategy Ψ(· , ·) on [τ¯ , T ]. Then the state equation reads (recall (3.8))
X(s) = ξ +
∫ s
t
b
(
r,X(r), (u ⊕Ψ|[τ¯ ,T ])(r,X(r))
)
dr
+
∫ s
t
σ
(
r,X(r), (u ⊕Ψ|[τ¯ ,T ])(r,X(r))
)
dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ].
(3.13)
The corresponding recursive cost functional (on [t, T ]) should be
J
(
t, ξ; (u⊕Ψ|[τ¯ ,T ])(·)
)
= Y (t), (3.14)
where (Y (·), Z(· , ·)) is the adapted solution to the following BSVIE:
Y (s) = h(s,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g
(
s, r,X(r), (u⊕Ψ|[τ¯ ,T ])(r,X(r)), Y (r), Z(s, r)
)
dr
−
∫ T
s
Z(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ].
(3.15)
Note that for s ∈ [t, τ¯ ], the state X(·) satisfies the following:
X(s) = ξ +
∫ s
t
b(r,X(r), u(r))dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,X(r), u(r))dW (r), s ∈ [t, τ¯ ], (3.16)
and the BSVIE (3.15) can be written as
Y (s) = h(s,X(T )) +
∫ T
τ¯
g
(
s, r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r)), Y (r), Z(s, r)
)
dr −
∫ T
τ¯
Z(s, r)dW (r)
+
∫ τ¯
s
g(s, r,X(r), u(r), Y (r), Z(s, r))dr −
∫ τ¯
s
Z(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, τ¯ ].
(3.17)
It seems to be difficult to write the above (3.17) as a BSDE on [t, τ¯ ] in general. In fact, even if the sum
of the first three terms on the right-hand side is Fτ¯ -measurable, due to the dependence on s of this sum
and the integrand of the fourth term, one at most can get a BSVIE on [t, τ¯ ]. Consequently, the optimal
control problem associated with the state equation (3.16) and cost functional (3.14) (determined through
(3.17)) is generally time-inconsistent, which could not be handled by the classical dynamic programming
approach. Therefore, instead of (3.15), we introduce the following modified BSVIE:
Y˜ (s) = hτ (s,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
gτ
(
s, r,X(r), (u⊕Ψ|[τ¯ ,T ])(r,X(r)), Y˜ (r), Z˜(s, r)
)
dr
−
∫ T
s
Z˜(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ],
(3.18)
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where {
hτ (s, x) = h(τ, x)1[τ,τ¯ ](s) + h(s, x)1(τ¯ ,T ](s),
gτ (s, r, x, u, y, z) = g(τ, r, x, u, y, z)1[τ,τ¯](s) + g(s, r, x, u, y, z)1(τ¯ ,T ](s).
Then we define the recursive cost functional for (t, ξ) ∈ [τ, τ¯ ]×Xt as follows:
Jτ (t, ξ;u(·)) = Y˜ (t), (3.19)
and pose the following optimal control problem.
Problem (CΨ[τ, τ¯ ]). For given (t, ξ) ∈ [τ, τ¯ ]×Xt, find a control u¯(·) ∈ U [t, τ¯ ] such that
Jτ (t, ξ; u¯(·)) = inf
u(·)∈U [t,τ¯ ]
Jτ (t, ξ;u(·)) ≡ V τ (t, ξ).
The above is referred to as a sophisticated optimal control problem on [τ, τ¯ ]. We have the following
result concerning the above problem.
Proposition 3.3. Let ΘΨ(· , · , ·) be a classical solution to the following:
ΘΨs (t, s, x) +H
(
t, s, x,Ψ(s, x),ΘΨ(s, s, x),ΘΨx (t, s, x),Θ
Ψ
xx(t, s, x)
)
= 0,
(t, s, x) ∈ ∆[τ¯ , T ]× Rn,
ΘΨ(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [τ¯ , T ]× Rn,
(3.20)
and let Θ˜Ψ(τ, · , ·) be a classical solution to the following:
Θ˜Ψs (τ, s, x) +H
(
τ, s, x,Ψ(s, x),ΘΨ(s, s, x), Θ˜Ψx (τ, s, x), Θ˜
Ψ
xx(τ, s, x)
)
= 0,
(s, x) ∈ [τ¯ , T ]× Rn,
Θ˜Ψ(τ, T, x) = h(τ, x), x ∈ Rn.
(3.21)
Then
Y˜ (s) = Θ˜Ψ(τ, τ¯ , X(τ¯)) +
∫ τ¯
s
g
(
τ, r,X(r), u(r), Y˜ (r), Z˜(r)
)
dr −
∫ τ¯
s
Z˜(r)dW (r), s ∈ [τ, τ¯ ]. (3.22)
Consequently, Problem (CΨ[τ, τ¯ ]) is time-consistent on [τ, τ¯ ].
Proof. By Proposition 2.2, we have{
Y˜ (s) = Y (s), τ¯ 6 s 6 T,
Z˜(s, r) = Z(s, r), τ¯ 6 s 6 r 6 T,
(3.23)
and
Z˜(s, r) = Z˜(r), t 6 s 6 τ¯ , s 6 r 6 T, (3.24)
with (Y˜ (·), Z˜(·)) being the adapted solution of the following BSDE:
Y˜ (s) = h(τ,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
(
g
(
τ, r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r)), Y (r), Z˜(r)
)
1[τ¯ ,T ](r)
+g
(
τ, r,X(r), u(r), Y˜ (r), Z˜(r)
)
1[τ,τ¯](r)
)
dr −
∫ T
s
Z˜(r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, τ¯ ].
(3.25)
On the other hand, by Proposition 2.3, we have the following representation:
Y (s) = ΘΨ(s, s,X(s)), Z(s, r) = ΘΨx
(
s, r,X(r)
)
σ
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)
, (s, r) ∈ ∆[τ¯ , T ], a.s., (3.26)
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where ΘΨ(· , · , ·) is the solution to (3.20). Thus, on [τ¯ , T ], we have the following FBSDE:
X(s) = X(τ¯ ) +
∫ s
τ¯
b
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)
dr +
∫ s
τ¯
σ
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)
dW (r),
Y˜ (s) = h(τ,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g
(
τ, r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r)),ΘΨ(r, r,X(r)), Z˜(r)
)
dr −
∫ T
s
Z˜(r)dW (r).
(3.27)
Then
Y˜ (s) = Θ˜Ψ(τ, s,X(s)), Z˜(s) = Θ˜Ψx (τ, s,X(s))σ
(
s,X(s),Ψ(s,X(s))
)
, s ∈ [τ¯ , T ], (3.28)
with Θ˜Ψ(τ, · , ·) solving (3.21). Hence, in particular,
Y˜ (τ¯ ) = Θ˜Ψ(τ, τ¯ , X(τ¯)).
Then (3.22) follows, which is a BSDE on [τ, τ¯ ]. This leads to that Problem (CΨ[τ, τ¯ ]) is a standard
optimal control problem with a recursive cost functional. Hence, it is time-consistent on [τ, τ¯ ].
Let us make a comment on (3.20) and (3.21). In the former, t is not fixed since in the equation, both
ΘΨ(t, s, x) and ΘΨ(s, s, x) appear. Whereas, in the latter, τ only plays a role of parameter and it is fixed.
Clearly, the former is much difficult than the latter, and their structures are essentially different.
From (2.12), we know that there exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ξ, u(·)) such that
|Y˜ (t)− Y (t)| 6 K(τ¯ − t)2, a.s., t ∈ [τ, τ¯ ]. (3.29)
Now, since Problem (CΨ[τ, τ¯ ]) is a standard optimal control problem with a recursive cost functional
which is time-consistent, we may use dynamic programming method. Thus, the value function V τ (· , ·)
of Problem (CΨ[τ, τ¯ ]) is the unique viscosity solution to the following HJB equation:V
τ
t (t, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
τ, t, x, u, V τ (t, x), V τx (t, x), V
τ
xx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [τ, τ¯ ]× Rn,
V τ (τ¯ , x) = Θ(τ, τ¯ , x), x ∈ Rn,
(3.30)
with the Hamiltonian H given by (3.11). Further, under the non-degenerate condition, V τ (· , ·) is the
unique classical solution to the above HJB equation. Then, we may define
Ψ(t, x) = ψ
(
τ, t, x, V τ (t, x), V τx (t, x), V
τ
xx(t, x)
)
, (t, x) ∈ [τ, τ¯ )× Rn. (3.31)
This extends Ψ from [τ¯ , T ] × Rn to [τ, T ] × Rn. For convenience, we refer to the above as the strategy
extension procedure for Ψ(· , ·).
With the above preparation, we now proceed a construction of equilibrium strategies. Let τ ∈ [0, T )
be fixed and let Π ≡ {tk | 0 6 k 6 N} be a partition of [τ, T ] with
τ = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN−1 < tN = T, (3.32)
whose mesh size ‖Π‖ is defined by
‖Π‖ , max
06i6N−1
|ti+1 − ti|.
For the given partition Π, denote
piΠ(t) =
N−2∑
k=0
tk1[tk,tk+1) + tN−11[tN−1,tN ],
piΠ(t) = t11[t0,t1] +
N−1∑
k=1
tk+11(tk,tk+1].
(3.33)
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Following the idea of [46], we now inductively construct a feedback strategy ΨΠ : [τ, T ] × Rn → U
associated with Π by means of optimal controls. For any t ∈ [tN−1, T ], we first consider the following
controlled SDE:
XN(s) = ξ +
∫ s
t
b(r,XN(r), uN (r))dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,XN (r), uN (r))dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ], (3.34)
with the recursive cost functional
JN (t, ξ;uN(·)) = Y N(t), (3.35)
where (Y N (·), ZN (·)) is the adapted solution to the following BSDE:
Y N (s) = h(tN−1, X
N(T )) +
∫ T
s
g
(
tN−1, r,X
N(r), uN (r), Y N (r), ZN (r)
)
dr
−
∫ T
s
ZN(r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ].
(3.36)
The optimal control problem associated with the above state equation (3.34) and recursive cost functional
(3.35)–(3.36) is time-consistent. By dynamic programming approach, under proper conditions, the value
function, denoted by, V N (· , ·) is the classical solution to the following HJB equation:V
N
s (s, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
tN−1, s, x, u, V
N (s, x), V Nx (s, x), V
N
xx(s, x)
)
= 0, (s, x) ∈ [tN−1, T ],
V N (T, x) = h(tN−1, x), x ∈ R
n,
(3.37)
with the Hamiltonian H given by (3.11). Then define feedback strategy
ΨN (s, x) = ψ
(
tN−1, s, x, V
N (s, x), V Nx (s, x), V
N
xx(s, x)
)
, (s, x) ∈ [tN−1, T ]× R
n, (3.38)
whose outcome
uN(s) = ΨN(s,XN (s)), s ∈ [tN−1, T ]
is an optimal control of the corresponding optimal control problem.
Next, by the above strategy extension procedure, we obtain an extension ΨN−1 : [tN−2, T ]×R
n → U
of ΨN (· , ·) by the following steps:
Step 1. Solve the following representation PDE parameterized by t ∈ [tN−1, T ]:
ΘN−1s (t, s, x) +H
(
t, s, x,ΨN (s, x),ΘN−1(s, s, x),ΘN−1x (t, s, x),Θ
N−1
xx (t, s, x)
)
= 0,
(t, s, x) ∈ ∆[tN−1, T ]× R
n,
ΘN−1(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [tN−1, T ]× R
n,
(3.39)
and then solve the following PDE:
Θ˜N−1s (s, x) +H
(
tN−2, s, x,Ψ
N(s, x),ΘN−1(s, s, x), Θ˜N−1x (s, x), Θ˜
N−1
xx (s, x)
)
= 0,
(s, x) ∈ [tN−1, T ]× R
n,
Θ˜N−1(T, x) = h(tN−2, x), x ∈ R
n.
(3.40)
Step 2. Solve the following HJB equation:
V N−1s (s, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
tN−2, s, x, u, V
N−1(s, x), V N−1x (s, x), V
N−1
xx (s, x)
)
= 0,
(s, x) ∈ [tN−2, tN−1]× R
n,
V N−1(tN−1, x) = Θ˜
N−1(tN−1, x), x ∈ R
n,
(3.41)
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with the Hamiltonian H given by (3.11), assuming that the classical solution V N−1(· , ·) exists.
Step 3. Define
ΨN−1(s, x)=
{
ΨN(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [tN−1, T ]× R
n,
ψ
(
tN−2, s, x, V
N−1(s, x), V N−1x (s, x), V
N−1
xx (s, x)
)
, (s, x)∈ [tN−2, tN−1)×R
n.
(3.42)
By verification theorem (Proposition 2.5), we know that the outcome
uN−1(s) = ΨN−1(s,XΨ
N−1
(s)), s ∈ [tN−2, tN−1]
of the feedback strategy ΨN−1(· , ·) is the optimal control for the corresponding sophisticated optimal
control problem on [tN−2, tN−1].
Now, suppose Ψk+1(· , ·) has been constructed on [tk, T ] × Rn, (for some k = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1). We
apply the above strategy extension procedure to obtain an extension Ψk : [tk−1, T ]×R
n → U of Ψk+1(· , ·)
by the following steps:
Step 1. Solve the following representation PDE parameterized by t ∈ [tk, T ]:
Θks(t, s, x) +H
(
t, s, x,Ψk+1(s, x),Θk(s, s, x),Θkx(t, s, x),Θ
k
xx(t, s, x)
)
= 0,
(t, s, x) ∈ ∆[tk, T ]× R
n,
Θk(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [tk, T ]× R
n,
(3.43)
and then solve the following PDE:
Θ˜ks(s, x)+H
(
tk−1, s, x,Ψ
k+1(s, x),Θk(s, s, x), Θ˜kx(s, x), Θ˜
k
xx(s, x)
)
=0,
(s, x) ∈ [tk, T ]× R
n,
Θ˜k(T, x) = h(tk−1, x), x ∈ R
n.
(3.44)
Step 2. Solve the following HJB equation:V
k
s (s, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
tk−1, s, x, u, V
k(s, x), V kx (s, x), V
k
xx(s, x)
)
= 0, (s, x) ∈ [tk−1, tk]× R
n,
V k(tk, x) = Θ˜
k(tk, x), x ∈ R
n,
(3.45)
with the Hamiltonian H given by (3.11), again, assuming the classical solution V k(· , ·) exists.
Step 3. Define
Ψk(s, x) =
{
Ψk+1(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [tk, T ]× R
n,
ψ
(
tk−1, s, x, V
k(s, x), V kx (s, x), V
k
xx(s, x)
)
, (s, x) ∈ [tk−1, tk)× R
n.
(3.46)
The same as above, the outcome
uk(s) = Ψk(s,XΨ
k
(s)), s ∈ [tk−1, tk],
of the feedback strategy Ψk(· , ·) is an optimal control of the corresponding sophisticated optimal control
on [tk−1, tk].
This completes the induction.
It is seen that Ψ0 : [τ, T ]×Rn → U is a feedback strategy whose outcome uk(·) on [tk−1, tk] is optimal
for the corresponding sophisticated problem on [tk−1, tk]. We call the above constructed Ψ
0(·, ·) (which
is determined by partition Π) an equilibrium strategy associated with Π. Our next goal is to obtain the
limit as ‖Π‖ → 0.
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To get the right ansatz, let us make an observation. Once Ψk(s, x) is defined for (s, x) ∈ [tk−1, T ]×Rn,
we may extend Θk(t, s, x) and Θ˜k(s, x) as follows:
Θks (t, s, x) +H
(
t, s, x,Ψk(s, x),Θk(s, s, x),Θkx(t, s, x),Θ
k
xx(t, s, x)
)
= 0,
(t, s, x) ∈ ∆[tk−1, T ]× R
n,
Θk(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [tk−1, T ]× R
n,
(3.47)
and
Θ˜ks (s, x)+H
(
tk−1, s, x,Ψ
k(s, x),Θk(s, s, x), Θ˜kx(s, x), Θ˜
k
xx(s, x)
)
=0, (s, x) ∈ [tk, T ]× R
n,
Θ˜ks (s, x)+H
(
tk−1, s, x,Ψ
k(s, x), Θ˜k(s, x), Θ˜kx(s, x), Θ˜
k
xx(s, x)
)
=0, (s, x) ∈ [tk−1, tk)× R
n,
Θ˜k(T, x) = h(tk−1, x), x ∈ R
n.
(3.48)
Then
V k(s, x) = Θ˜k(s, x), s ∈ [tk−1, tk), x ∈ R
n.
Now, for any given partition Π of [τ, T ], we define
ΘΠ(t, s, x) = Θk(t, s, x), (t, s, x) ∈ ∆[tk, T ]× R
n, k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1,
Θ˜Π(t, s, x) =
N∑
k=1
Θ˜k(s, x)1[tk−1,tk)(t), (t, s, x) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]× R
n,
hΠ(t, x) =
N∑
k=1
h(tk−1, x)1[tk−1,tk)(t), (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× R
n,
gΠ(t, s, x, u, y, z) =
N∑
k=1
g(tk−1, s, x, u, y, z)1[tk−1,tk)(t),
(t, s, x, u, y, z) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]× Rn × U × R× R1×d.
(3.49)
Note that
Θj(t, s, x) = Θk(t, s, x), (t, s, x) ∈ ∆[tk, T ]× R
n, 1 6 j 6 k 6 N.
Thus ΘΠ(·, ·, ·) is well-defined. Then ΘΠ(·, ·, ·) and Θ˜Π(·, ·, ·) satisfy the following PDEs:
ΘΠs (t, s, x) +H
(
t, s, x,ΨΠ(s, x),ΘΠ(s, s, x),ΘΠx (t, s, x),Θ
Π
xx(t, s, x)
)
= 0,
(t, s, x) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]× Rn,
ΘΠ(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn,
(3.50)
and 
Θ˜Πs (t, s, x) +H
Π
(
t, s, x,ΨΠ(s, x),ΘΠ(s, s, x), Θ˜Πx (t, s, x), Θ˜
Π
xx(t, s, x)
)
= 0,
t ∈ [τ, T ], s ∈ [p˜iΠ(t), T ], x ∈ Rn,
Θ˜Πs (t, s, x) +H
Π
(
t, s, x,ΨΠ(s, x), Θ˜Π(t, s, x), Θ˜Πx (t, s, x), Θ˜
Π
xx(t, s, x)
)
= 0,
t ∈ [τ, T ], s ∈ [t, p˜iΠ(t)] , x ∈ Rn,
Θ˜Π(t, T, x) = hΠ(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn,
(3.51)
where
H
Π(t, s, x, u, θ, p, P ) =
1
2
tr [Pσ(s, x, u)σ(s, x, u)⊤] + pb(s, x, u) + gΠ(t, s, x, u, θ, pσ(s, x, u)),
(t, s, x, u, θ, p, P ) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]× Rn × U × R× R1×n × Sn,
(3.52)
and
ΨΠ(s, x) = ψ(piΠ(s), s, x, Θ˜Π(s, s, x), Θ˜Πx (s, s, x), Θ˜
Π
xx(s, s, x)), (s, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× R
n. (3.53)
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Note that
|hΠ(t, x)− h(t, x)| =
N∑
k=1
|h(tk−1, x)− h(t, x)|1[tk−1,tk)(t) 6 L‖Π‖, (3.54)
and likewise,
|HΠ(t, s, x, u, θ, p, P )−H(t, s, x, u, θ, p, P )|
= |gΠ(t, s, x, u, θ, pσ(s, x, u))− g(t, s, x, u, θ, pσ(s, x, u))| 6 L‖Π‖.
(3.55)
Therefore, at the limit, one should have{
Θs(t, s, x)+H
(
t, s, x,Ψ(s, x),Θ(s, s, x),Θx(t, s, x),Θxx(t, s, x)
)
= 0, (t, s, x)∈∆[τ, T ]×Rn,
Θ(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn,
(3.56)
{
Θ˜s(t, s, x)+H
(
t, s, x,Ψ(s, x),Θ(s, s, x), Θ˜x(t, s, x), Θ˜xx(t, s, x)
)
= 0, (t, s, x)∈∆[τ, T ]×Rn,
Θ(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn,
(3.57)
V (s, x) = Θ˜(s, s, x), (s, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn, (3.58)
and
Ψ(s, x) = ψ
(
s, s, x, Θ˜(s, s, x), Θ˜x(s, s, x), Θ˜xx(s, s, x)
)
, (s, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn. (3.59)
Let (3.56) admit a unique classical solution. Then
Θ˜(t, s, x) = Θ(t, s, x), (t, s, x) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]× Rn, (3.60)
and thus
V (s, x) = Θ˜(s, s, x) = Θ(s, s, x), (s, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn, (3.61)
Ψ(s, x) = ψ
(
s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x),Θxx(s, s, x)
)
(s, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn. (3.62)
We call (3.56) the equilibrium HJB equation of Problem (N), and V (·, ·) the equilibrium value function
of Problem (N). The map Ψ(·, ·) defined by (3.62) is a feedback strategy of Problem (N) provided that (3.56)
has a solution with good regularities. We will show that the feedback strategy Ψ(·, ·) is an equilibrium
strategy of Problem (N) in the next section. Note that the equilibrium HJB equation (3.56) can actually
be written as follows:
Θs(t, s, x) +
1
2
tr
[
Θxx(t, s, x)a
(
s, x, ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x),Θxx(s, s, x))
)]
+Θx(t, s, x)b
(
s, x, ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x),Θxx(s, s, x))
)
+g
(
t, s, x, ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x),Θxx(s, s, x)),Θ(s, s, x),
Θx(t, s, x)σ(s, x, ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x),Θxx(s, s, x)))
)
= 0,
(t, s, x) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]× Rn,
Θ(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn,
(3.63)
where
a(s, x, u) , σ(s, x, u)σ(s, x, u)⊤, (s, x, u) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn × U. (3.64)
Taking the feedback strategy Ψ(· , ·) defined by (3.62), the corresponding closed-loop system is
X¯(s) = ξ +
∫ s
τ
b
(
r, X¯(r),Ψ(r, X¯(r))
)
dr +
∫ s
τ
σ
(
r, X¯(r),Ψ(r, X¯(r))
)
dW (r), s ∈ [τ, T ],
Y¯ (s) = h(s, X¯(T )) +
∫ T
s
g
(
s, r, X¯(r),Ψ(r, X¯(r)), Y¯ (r), Z¯(s, r)
)
dr
−
∫ T
s
Z¯(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [τ, T ].
(3.65)
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The equilibrium value function is
V (s, X¯(s)) = Θ(s, s, X¯(s)) = Y¯ (s), s ∈ [τ, T ]. (3.66)
Also,
Z¯(t, s) = Θx(t, s, X¯(s))σ
(
s, X¯(s),Ψ(s, X¯(s))
)
, (t, s) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]. (3.67)
We see that (3.66)–(3.67) exhibits an interesting relationship between equilibrium HJB equation (3.63)
and coupled FSDE and BSVIE (3.65). We will explore more about this in Section 5.
4 Verification Theorem andWell-Posedness of Equilibrium HJB
Equation
For any partition Π, we have constructed an approximate equilibrium strategy ΨΠ(·, ·) of Problem (N).
Taking the limit lim
‖Π‖→0
ΨΠ(·, ·), we have formally obtained the feedback strategy Ψ(·, ·). In this section,
we would like to show that Ψ(·, ·) is an equilibrium strategy of Problem (N) in the sense of Definition 3.2.
Such a result can be viewed as a verification theorem for our constructed strategy Ψ(·, ·).
In order to show the local optimality of the feedback strategy Ψ(·, ·), we assume that the equilibrium
HJB equation (3.63) admits a unique smooth solution. We also assume that all the involved functions
are bounded and differentiable with bounded derivatives. For any fixed t ∈ [0, T ) and ε > 0 small with
t+ ε 6 T , we consider Problem (CΨ[t, t+ ε]). Then by Proposition 3.3, the state equation and the cost
functional of Problem (CΨ[t, t+ ε]) can be given by
X(s) = ξ +
∫ s
t
b(r,X(r), u(r))dr +
∫ s
t
σ(r,X(r), u(r))dW (r), s ∈ [t, t+ ε], (4.1)
and
J t(t, ξ;u(·)) = Y˜ (t), (4.2)
with (Y˜ (·), Z˜(·)) being the adapted solution of the following BSDE:
Y˜ (s) = Θ(t, t+ ε,X(t+ ε)) +
∫ t+ε
s
g
(
t, r,X(r), u(r), Y˜ (r), Z˜(r)
)
dr
−
∫ t+ε
s
Z˜(r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, t+ ε].
(4.3)
Note that Problem (CΨ[t, t + ε]) is a classical recursive stochastic optimal control problem and thus is
time consistent. Let Θε(t, ·, ·) be the unique classical solution of the following HJB equation:{
Θεs(t, s, x)+H
(
t, s, x,Ψε(s, x),Θε(t, s, x),Θεx(t, s, x),Θ
ε
xx(t, s, x)
)
= 0, (s, x)∈ [t, t + ε]×Rn,
Θε(t, t+ ε, x) = Θ(t, t+ ε, x), x ∈ Rn,
(4.4)
where
Ψε(s, x) = ψ
(
t, s, x,Θε(t, s, x),Θεx(t, s, x),Θ
ε
xx(t, s, x)
)
, (s, x)∈ [t, t + ε]×Rn. (4.5)
By Proposition 2.5, the outcome uε(·) = Ψε(·, Xε(·)) of strategy Ψε(·, ·) is an optimal control of Problem
(CΨ[t, t+ ε]); that is
J t(t, ξ; Ψε(·, ·)) = inf
u(·)∈U [t,t+ε]
J t(t, ξ;u(·)). (4.6)
Note that Θ(·, ·, ·) satisfies the following equation on ∆[t, t+ ε]:{
Θs(τ, s, x)+H
(
τ, s, x,Ψ(s, x),Θ(s, s, x),Θx(τ, s, x),Θxx(τ, s, x)
)
=0, (τ, s, x)∈∆[t, t+ε]×Rn,
Θ(τ, t+ ε, x) = Θ(τ, t+ ε, x), (τ, x) ∈ [t, t+ ε]× Rn,
(4.7)
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where
Ψ(s, x) = ψ
(
s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x),Θxx(s, s, x)
)
, (s, x)∈ [t, t + ε]×Rn. (4.8)
We observe that the H-term of (4.7) depends on the diagonal values Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x),Θxx(s, s, x) of
the unknown variables and the H-term of (4.4) depends on Θε(t, s, x),Θεx(t, s, x),Θ
ε
xx(t, s, x). Thus (4.7)
is a non-local PDE and (4.4) is a classical PDE with the parameter t. Then in general, we do not have
Θε(t, s, x) = Θ(t, s, x), (s, x)∈ [t, t + ε]×Rn. (4.9)
Therefore, there are some gaps in the proofs of the verification theorem in [43, 28]. In fact, if (4.9) holds,
by (4.4)–(4.7), we get
H
(
t, s, x,Ψε(s, x),Θε(t, s, x),Θεx(t, s, x),Θ
ε
xx(t, s, x)
)
= H
(
t, s, x,Ψ(s, x),Θ(s, s, x),Θx(t, s, x),Θxx(t, s, x)
)
, (s, x) ∈ [t, t+ ε]× Rn.
Then the following should hold true:
Θε(t, s, x) = Θ(s, s, x), (s, x)∈ [t, t + ε]×Rn.
Combining the above with (4.9) yields that
Θ(t, s, x) = Θ(s, s, x), (s, x)∈ [t, t + ε]×Rn. (4.10)
Since the H-term of (4.7) depends on τ ; t 6 τ 6 t+ ε, the above equality usually fails. Therefore, we do
not have (4.9) in general.
By Proposition 2.2, we know that there exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ξ, u(·)) such that∣∣J t(t, ξ;u(·))− J(t, ξ;u ⊕Ψ|[t+ε,T ])∣∣ 6 Kε2. (4.11)
Combining the above with (4.6), we have
J(t, ξ; Ψε ⊕Ψ|[t+ε,T ]) 6 J(t, ξ;u⊕Ψ|[t+ε,T ]) + o(ε), ∀u(·) ∈ U [t, t+ ε], (4.12)
where o(ε) is uniform in u(·) ∈ U [t, t + ε]. Thus (Ψε ⊕ Ψ|[t+ε,T ])(·, ·) satisfies the local near-optimality
(3.9). Next, we would like to show that Ψ(·, ·) satisfies the local optimality condition (3.10) under the
following assumption:
(H4) There exists a nondecreasing continuous function ρ˜ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) with ρ˜(0) = 0 such that
|Θε(t, s, x)−Θ(t, s, x)|+ |Θεx(t, s, x)−Θx(t, s, x)|+ |Θ
ε
xx(t, s, x)−Θxx(t, s, x)| 6 ρ˜(ε)(1 + |x|),
∀(s, x) ∈ [t, t+ ε]× Rn,
where Θ(·, ·, ·) and Θε(·, ·, ·) are the classical solutions of the PDE (4.7) and (4.4), respectively.
Under (H4), by the definitions of Ψε(·, ·) and Ψ(·, ·), we have
|Ψε(s, x)−Ψ(s, x)|
=
∣∣ψ(t, s, x,Θε(t, s, x),Θεx(t, s, x),Θεxx(t, s, x))− ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x),Θxx(s, s, x))∣∣
6
∣∣ψ(t, s, x,Θε(t, s, x),Θεx(t, s, x),Θεxx(t, s, x))− ψ(t, s, x,Θ(t, s, x),Θx(t, s, x),Θxx(t, s, x))∣∣
+
∣∣ψ(t, s, x,Θ(t, s, x),Θx(t, s, x),Θxx(t, s, x))− ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x),Θxx(s, s, x))∣∣
6 Kρ˜(ε)(1 + |x|) +K|s− t| 6 K[ρ˜(ε) + ε](1 + |x|) , ρ(ε)(1 + |x|), (s, x) ∈ [t, t+ ε]× Rn.
(4.13)
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Let (X(·), Y˜ (·), Z˜(·)) ≡ (XΨ(·), Y˜ Ψ(·), Z˜Ψ(·)) and (Xε(·), Y˜ ε(·), Z˜ε(·)) ≡ (XΨ
ε
(·), Y˜ Ψ
ε
(·), Z˜Ψ
ε
(·)) be the
unique solutions to the controlled SDE (4.1) and BSDE (4.3) corresponding to the feedback strategies
Ψ(·, ·) and Ψε(·, ·), respectively. By Lemma 2.1 and (4.13), we have
Et
(
sup
t6s6t+ε
|Xε(s)|2
)
6 KEt
{
1 + |ξ|2 +
∫ t+ε
t
∣∣Ψε(r,Xε(r))∣∣2dr}
6 KEt
{
1 + |ξ|2 +
∫ t+ε
t
[
|Ψ(r,Xε(r))|2 + ρ(ε)2(1 + |Xε(r)|2)
]
dr
}
6 KEt
{
1 + |ξ|2 +
∫ t+ε
t
[
1 + |Xε(r)|2 + ρ(T − t)2(1 + |Xε(r)|2)
]
dr
}
6 KEt
{
1 + |ξ|2 +
∫ t+ε
t
|Xε(r)|2dr
}
.
(4.14)
Then by Gro¨nwall’s inequality, there exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ε) such that
Et
(
sup
t6s6t+ε
|Xε(s)|2
)
6 KEt[1 + |ξ|
2] = K(1 + |ξ|2). (4.15)
Combining the above with the standard estimate of SDEs, we have
Et
(
sup
t6s6t+ε
|Xε(s)−X(s)|2
)
6 KEt
{∫ t+ε
t
∣∣b(r,X(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))) − b(r,X(r),Ψ(r,Xε(r)))∣∣2dr
+
∫ t+ε
t
∣∣σ(r,X(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))) − σ(r,X(r),Ψ(r,Xε(r)))∣∣2dr}
6 KEt
{∫ t+ε
t
ρ(ε)2(1 + |Xε(r)|2)dr
}
6 Kερ(ε)2(1 + |ξ|2).
(4.16)
In particular,
Et|X
ε(t+ ε)−X(t+ ε)|2 6 Kερ(ε)2(1 + |ξ|2). (4.17)
Let us recall (4.3). Then by the standard estimate of BSDEs and (4.16)–(4.17), we have
Et
[
sup
t6s6t+ε
|Y˜ ε(s)− Y˜ (s)|2
]
+ Et
[ ∫ t+ε
t
|Z˜ε(r) − Z˜(r)|2dr
]
6 KEt
[
|Θ(t, t+ ε,Xε(t+ ε))−Θ(t, t+ ε,X(t+ ε))|2
]
+KEt
[ ∫ t+ε
t
∣∣g(t, r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r)), Y˜ (r), Z˜(r))
− g
(
t, r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r)), Y˜ (r), Z˜(r)
)∣∣dr]2
6 Kερ(ε)2(1 + |ξ|2) +KεEt
∫ t+ε
t
[
|Xε(r)−X(r)|2 + |Ψε(r,Xε(r)) −Ψ(r,Xε(r))|2
+ |Ψ(r,Xε(r)) −Ψ(r,X(r))|2
]
dr
6 Kερ(ε)2(1 + |ξ|2) +KεEt
∫ t+ε
t
[
|Xε(r) −X(r)|2 + |Ψε(r,Xε(r)) − Ψ(r,Xε(r))|2
]
dr
6 Kερ(ε)2(1 + |ξ|2) +Kε2ρ(ε)2(1 + |ξ|2) +KεEt
∫ t+ε
t
ρ(ε)2
(
1 + |Xε(r)|2
)
dr
6 Kερ(ε)2(1 + |ξ|2).
(4.18)
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Observe that
|Y˜ ε(t)− Y˜ (t)|2 =
∣∣∣Et{Θ(t, t+ ε,Xε(t+ ε))−Θ(t, t+ ε,X(t+ ε))
+
∫ t+ε
t
[
g
(
t, r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r)), Y˜ ε(r), Z˜ε(r)
)
− g
(
t, r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r)), Y˜ (r), Z˜(r)
)]
dr
}∣∣∣2.
Then by Ho¨lder inequality and (4.13)–(4.16)–(4.18), we have
|Y˜ ε(t)− Y˜ (t)|2 6 K
∣∣Et[Θ(t, t+ ε,Xε(t+ ε))−Θ(t, t+ ε,X(t+ ε))]∣∣2
+KεEt
∫ t+ε
t
∣∣g(t, r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r)), Y˜ ε(r), Z˜ε(r))
− g
(
t, r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r)), Y˜ (r), Z˜(r)
)∣∣2dr
6 K
∣∣Et[Θ(t, t+ ε,Xε(t+ ε))−Θ(t, t+ ε,X(t+ ε))]∣∣2
+KεEt
∫ t+ε
t
[
|X(r)−Xε(r)|2 + |Ψε(r,Xε(r)) −Ψ(r,Xε(r))|2
+ |Y˜ ε(r) − Y˜ (r)|2 + |Z˜ε(r) − Z˜(r)|2
]
dr
6 K
∣∣Et[Θ(t, t+ ε,Xε(t+ ε))−Θ(t, t+ ε,X(t+ ε))]∣∣2 +Kε2ρ(ε)2(1 + |ξ|2).
(4.19)
Applying Itoˆ formula to s 7→ Θ(t, t+ ε,X(s)) on [t, t+ ε] implies that
Θ(t, t+ ε,X(t+ ε))
= Θ(t, t+ ε, ξ) +
∫ t+ε
t
{
Θx(t, t+ ε,X(r))b
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)
+
1
2
tr
[
Θxx(t, t+ ε,X(r))σ
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)
σ
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)⊤]}
dr
+
∫ t+ε
t
Θx(t, t+ ε,X(r))σ
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)
dW (r).
(4.20)
Similarly,
Θ(t, t+ ε,Xε(t+ ε))
= Θ(t, t+ ε, ξ) +
∫ t+ε
t
{
Θx(t, t+ ε,X
ε(r))b
(
r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))
)
+
1
2
tr
[
Θxx(t, t+ ε,X
ε(r))σ
(
r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))
)
σ
(
r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))
)⊤]}
dr
+
∫ t+ε
t
Θx(t, t+ ε,X
ε(r))σ
(
r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))
)
dW (r).
(4.21)
Thus, we get∣∣Et[Θ(t, t+ ε,Xε(t+ ε))−Θ(t, t+ ε,X(t+ ε))]∣∣2
=
∣∣∣Et ∫ t+ε
t
{
Θx(t, t+ ε,X(r))
⊤b
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)
−Θx(t, t+ ε,X
ε(r))⊤b
(
r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))
)
+
1
2
tr
[
Θxx(t, t+ ε,X(r))σ
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)
σ
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)⊤]
−
1
2
tr
[
Θxx(t, t+ ε,X
ε(r))σ
(
r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))
)
σ
(
r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))
)⊤]}
dr
∣∣∣2
6 KεEt
∫ t+ε
t
∣∣Θx(t, t+ε,X(r))⊤b(r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r)))−Θx(t, t+ε,Xε(r))⊤b(r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r)))
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+
1
2
tr
[
Θxx(t, t+ ε,X(r))σ
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)
σ
(
r,X(r),Ψ(r,X(r))
)⊤]
−
1
2
tr
[
Θxx(t, t+ ε,X
ε(r))σ
(
r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))
)
σ
(
r,Xε(r),Ψε(r,Xε(r))
)⊤]∣∣2dr
6 KεEt
∫ t+ε
t
[
|Ψε(r,Xε(r)) −Ψ(r,Xε(r))|2 + |Xε(r) −X(r)|2
]
dr.
Then by (4.13) and (4.16), the above implies that∣∣Et[Θ(t, t+ ε,Xε(t+ ε))−Θ(t, t+ ε,X(t+ ε))]∣∣2 6 Kε2ρ(ε)2(1 + |ξ|2). (4.22)
Substituting (4.22) into (4.19), we have
|J t(t, ξ; Ψε(·, ·))− J t(t, ξ; Ψ(·, ·))|2 = |Y˜ ε(t)− Y˜ (t)|2 6 Kε2ρ(ε)2(1 + |ξ|2).
Combining the above with (4.6), we get
J t(t, ξ; Ψ(·, ·)) 6 inf
u(·)∈U [t,t+ε]
J t(t, ξ;u(·)) + o(ε).
Then by Proposition 2.2, we have the following local near optimality of Ψ(·, ·):
J
(
t, ξ; Ψ
∣∣
[t,T ]
)
6 J
(
t, ξ;u⊕Ψ|[t+ε,T ]
)
+ o(ε), ∀u(·) ∈ U [t, t+ ε]. (4.23)
In conclusion, we can state the following result formally.
Theorem 4.1. Feedback strategy Ψ(·, ·) defined by (3.62) is an equilibrium strategy of Problem (N).
Since Ψ(· , ·) is an equilibrium strategy of Problem (N), the corresponding closed-loop system (3.65)
is called an equilibrium system.
We now look at the well-posedness of the equilibrium HJB equation. To this end, we first observe the
expression
Ψ(s, x) = ψ
(
s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x),Θxx(s, s, x)
)
, (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
From the definition (3.12) of ψ(·), it is clear that the dependence of σ(·) on the control process u(·)
leads to the appearance of Θxx(s, s, x) in Ψ(s, x), which turns out to bring some essential difficulties in
establishing the well-posedness of equilibrium HJB equation. At the moment, such a general situation is
widely open and will be investigated in our future publications. In the subsequent analysis of this section,
we will consider a special but still important case, in which σ(·) is independent of the control process
u(·). More precisely, we assume that
σ(t, x, u) = σ(t, x), (t, x, u) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × U. (4.24)
Under (4.24), (H3) becomes the following:
(H3)′ There is a continuous map ψ : ∆[0, T ]× Rn × R× R1×n → U such that
pb(s, x, ψ(t, s, x, θ, p)) + g(t, s, x, ψ(t, s, x, θ, p), θ, pσ(s, x))
= min
u∈U
[
pb(s, x, u) + g(t, s, x, u, θ, pσ(s, x))
]
, (t, s, x, θ, p) ∈ ∆[0, T ]× Rn × R× R1×n.
(4.25)
Under (H3)′, the equilibrium HJB equation (3.63) (with τ = 0) reads
Θs(t, s, x) +
1
2
tr [Θxx(t, s, x)a(s, x)] + Θx(t, s, x)b
(
s, x, ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x))
)
+ g
(
t, s, x, ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x)),Θ(s, s, x),Θx(t, s, x)σ(s, x)
)
= 0,
(t, s, x) ∈ ∆[0, T ]× Rn,
Θ(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
(4.26)
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where a(·) is defined by (3.64). In the current case, the equilibrium strategy is given by
Ψ(s, x) = ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x)), (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n, (4.27)
for which Θxx(· , · , ·) does not appear.
For the well-posedness of (4.26), we make the following assumption.
(H5). The maps{
(s, x, θ, p) 7→ b(s, x, ψ(s, s, x, θ, p)), (s, x) 7→ a(s, x),
(t, s, x, θ, p, pˆ) 7→ g(t, s, x, ψ(s, s, x, θ, p), θ, pˆσ(s, x)), (s, x) 7→ h(s, x)
are bounded, have all required differentiability with bounded derivatives. Moreover, there exist two
constants λ0, λ1 > 0 such that
λ0I 6 a(t, x) 6 λ1I, ∀ (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n.
We have the following result whose proof can be found in [43, Theorem 6.1].
Theorem 4.2. Let (H5) hold. Then PDE (4.26) admits a unique classical solution.
In the proof of Theorem 4.1, we introduce the assumption (H4) to get the local near optimality of the
equilibrium strategy Ψ(·, ·). When σ(·) is independent of the control u(·) (see (4.24)), the arguments of
Theorem 4.1 still hold true with Assumption (H4) replaced by the following assumption:
(H4)′ There exists a nondecreasing continuous function ρ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) with ρ(0) = 0 such that
|Θε(t, s, x) −Θ(t, s, x)|+ |Θεx(t, s, x)−Θx(t, s, x)| 6 ρ(ε)(1 + |x|), ∀(s, x) ∈ [t, t+ ε]× R
n.
We shall show that the above assumption is a consequence of (H5). In fact, under (H5), it follows from
Theorem 4.2 that Θ(·, t+ ε, ·) is well-defined and belongs to C1,2([t, t+ ε]×Rn;R). Thus one can regard
(4.7) as a new equilibrium HJB equation satisfying (H5) with h(·, ·) and [0, T ] replaced by Θ(·, t + ε, ·)
and [t, t+ε], respectively. Moreover, we see that PDE (4.4) is the approximate equation of (4.7) with the
partition Π : t = t0 < t1 = t+ ε. Then by the last inequality in the proof of [43, Theorem 6.2], we have
|Θε(t, s, x)−Θ(t, s, x)|+ |Θεx(t, s, x)−Θx(t, s, x)| 6 K‖Π‖ = Kε, ∀(s, x) ∈ [t, t+ ε]× R
n,
for some constant K > 0, which implies that the assumption (H4)′ holds. Therefore, under (H1), (H2),
(H3)′, and (H5), Problem (N) admits an equilibrium strategy over [0, T ].
5 BSVIEs with Diagonal Values of Z(· , ·).
In this section, we look at a new type BSVIE resulted from the equilibrium solution to Problem (N). Let
(H5) hold with d = n and (4.24) hold, namely, σ is independent of u. Thus, σ(s, x) is invertible. Let
Θ(· , · , ·) be the classical solution to the equilibrium HJB equation (4.26). Then Ψ(· , ·) defined by (4.27)
is an equilibrium strategy. Substituting this Ψ(· , ·) into (3.65) leads to the following closed-loop system:
X¯(s) = ξ +
∫ s
τ
b
(
r, X¯(r), ψ(r, r, X¯(r),Θ(r, r, X¯(r)),Θx(r, r, X¯(r)))
)
dr
+
∫ s
τ
σ(r, X¯(r))dW (r),
Y¯ (s)=h(s, X¯(T ))+
∫ T
s
g
(
s, r, X¯(r), ψ(r, r, X¯(r),Θ(r, r, X¯(r)),Θx(r, r, X¯(r))), Y¯ (r), Z¯(s, r)
)
dr
−
∫ T
s
Z¯(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [τ, T ].
(5.1)
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On the other hand, we have
Y¯ (r) = Θ(r, r, X¯(r)) ≡ V (r, X¯(r)), r ∈ [τ, T ], (5.2)
and
Z¯(s, r) = Θx(s, r, X¯(r))σ(r, X¯(r)), (s, r) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]. (5.3)
Thus,
Θx(r, s, X¯(r)) = Z¯(s, r)σ(r, X¯(r))
−1, (s, r) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]. (5.4)
Consequently, the above closed-loop system can be written as follows.
X¯(s) = ξ +
∫ s
τ
b
(
r, X¯(r), ψ(r, r, X¯(r), Y¯ (r), Z¯(r, r)σ(r, X¯(r))−1)
)
dr +
∫ s
τ
σ(r, X¯(r))dW (r),
Y¯ (s)=h(s, X¯(T ))+
∫ T
s
g
(
s, r, X¯(r), ψ(r, r, X¯(r), Y¯ (r), Z¯(r, r)σ(r, X¯(r))−1), Y¯ (r), Z¯(s, r)
)
dr
−
∫ T
s
Z¯(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [τ, T ].
(5.5)
If we denote
b¯(r, x, y, ζ) = b
(
r, x, ψ(r, r, x, y, ζσ(r, x)−1
)
, (r, x, y, ζ) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn × R× R1×n,
g¯
(
s, r, x, y, z, ζ) = g(s, r, x, ψ(r, r, x, y, ζσ(r, x)−1), y, z
)
,
(s, r, x, y, z, ζ) ∈ ∆[τ, T ]× Rn × R× R1×n × R1×n.
(5.6)
Then the above closed-loop system can further be written as follows.
X¯(s) = ξ +
∫ s
τ
b¯
(
r, X¯(r), Y¯ (r), Z¯(r, r)
)
dr +
∫ s
τ
σ(r, X¯(r))dW (r),
Y¯ (s)=h(s, X¯(T ))+
∫ T
s
g¯
(
s, r, X¯(r), Y¯ (r), Z¯(s, r), Z¯(r, r)
)
dr −
∫ T
s
Z¯(s, r)dW (r),
s ∈ [τ, T ]. (5.7)
Unlike the BSVIEs studied in the literature, the above BSVIE contains the diagonal values Z¯(r, r) of
Z(· , ·). To our best knowledge, this is the first time that such a BSVIE appears. Our above results show
that the above coupled FSDE and BSVIE admits an adapted solution (X¯(·), Y¯ (·), Z¯(· , ·)). Moreover, the
representation (5.2)–(5.3) holds, with Θ(· , · , ·) being the classical solution to the equilibrium HJB equa-
tion (4.26). We point out that (5.2) and (5.4), which represents the solution Θ(· , · , ·) to the equilibrium
HJB equation (4.26), is a kind of Feynman–Kac formula.
The above naturally motivates us to investigate the following more general coupled FSDE and BSVIE:
X(s) = ξ +
∫ s
τ
b
(
r,X(r), Y (r), Z(r, r)
)
dr +
∫ s
τ
σ
(
r,X(r), Y (r)
)
dW (r),
Y (s)=h(s,X(T ))+
∫ T
s
g
(
s, r,X(r), Y (r), Z(s, r), Z(r, r)
)
dr −
∫ T
s
Z(s, r)dW (r), s ∈ [τ, T ].
(5.8)
The main feature is that the generator g of the above BSVIE contains the diagonal value Z(r, r). In the
rest of this section, we will sketch some relevant results of the above coupled FSDE and BSVIE. More
general detailed investigation of such BSVIEs will be carried out elsewhere.
Inspired by the results of previous sections, as well as the ideas from [24, 40], we let (t, s, x) 7→ Θ(t, s, x)
be C0,1,2(∆[0, T ]× Rn). Applying Itoˆ’s formula to the process s 7→ Θ(t, s,X(s)), one obtains
Θ(t, T,X(T ))−Θ(t, t,X(t)) =
∫ T
t
[
Θs(t, s,X(s)) + Θx(t, s,X(s))b(s,X(s), Y (s), Z(s, s))
+
1
2
tr
(
Θxx(t, s,X(s))a(s,X(s), Y (s))
)]
ds
+
∫ T
t
Θx(t, s,X(s))σ(s,X(s), Y (s))dW (s),
(5.9)
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where
a(s, x, y) = σ(s, x, y)σ(s, x, y)⊤, (s, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R.
Comparing (5.9) with the BSVIE in (5.8), we see that the following should be the right choice:
Θ(t, T,X(T )) = h(t,X(T )), (5.10)
Y (t) = Θ(t, t,X(t)), Z(t, s) = Θx(t, s,X(s))σ(s,X(s), Y (s)), (5.11)
and
Θs(t, s,X(s)) + Θx(t, s,X(s))b
(
s,X(s), Y (s), Z(s, s)
)
+
1
2
tr
(
Θxx(t, s,X(s))a(s,X(s), Y (s))
)
+ g
(
t, s,X(s), Y (s), Z(t, s), Z(s, s)
)
= 0.
Thus, formally, we should have
Θs(t, s,X(s)) + Θx(t, s,X(s))b
(
s,X(s),Θ(s, s,X(s)),Θx(s, s,X(s))σ(s,X(s),Θ(s, s,X(s)))
)
+
1
2
tr
(
Θxx(t, s,X(s))a
(
s,X(s),Θ(s, s,X(s))
))
+g
(
t, s,X(s),Θ(s, s,X(s)),Θx(t, s,X(s))σ(s,X(s),Θ(s, s,X(s))),
Θx(s, s,X(s))σ(s,X(s),Θ(s, s,X(s)))
)
= 0.
Hence, we have the following result.
Theorem 5.1. Let the following system admit a classical solution Θ(· , · , ·):
Θs(t, s, x) +
1
2
tr
[
Θxx(t, s, x)a(s, x,Θ(s, s, x))
]
+Θx(t, s, x)b
(
s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x)σ(s, x,Θ(s, s, x))
)
+g
(
t, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(t, s, x)σ(s, x,Θ(s, s, x)),Θx(s, s, x)σ(s, x,Θ(s, s, x))
)
= 0,
Θ(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
(5.12)
Let X(·) ≡ X(· ; τ, ξ) be the solution to the following FSDE:
X(s) = ξ +
∫ s
τ
b
(
r,X(r),Θ(r, r,X(r)),Θx(r, r,X(r))σ(r,X(r),Θ(r, r,X(r)))
)
dr
+
∫ s
τ
σ
(
s,X(s),Θ(r, r,X(r))
)
dW (r), s ∈ [τ, T ].
Then (Y (·), Z(· , ·)) defined by (5.11) is an adapted solution to the BSVIE in (5.8).
When σ(s, x, θ) is independent of θ, Theorem 4.2 provides a sufficient condition for the well-posedness
of (5.12). We now look at the uniqueness of the adapted solutions (5.8). To this end, let us first introduce
the following assumption.
(H6). Let d = n. There exist maps µ : ∆[0, T ]→ R, ν : ∆[0, T ]→ R, g0 : [0, T ]×R
n×R×R1×n → R,
h0 : [0, T ]× Rn → R, α : [0, T ]→ Rn such that
h(t, x) = µ(t, T )h0(T, x), ∀ (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n,
g¯(t, s, x, y, ζ, z) = ν(t, s)g0(s, x, y, ζ) + zα(s),
∀ (t, s, x, y, ζ, z) ∈ ∆[0, T ]× Rn × R× R1×n × R1×n.
(5.13)
Suppose that the above maps are all bounded, have all required differentiability with bounded derivatives.
There exist continuous maps M,N ,K : [0, T ]→ R and M : [0, T ]2 → R such that
M(t) > 0, M(t)µ(t, T )−M(s)µ(s, T ) =M(t, s)N (T ), t, s ∈ [0, T ],
M(t)ν(t, r) −M(s)ν(s, r) =M(t, s)K(r), t, s, r ∈ [0, T ].
(5.14)
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Let us list some possible functions µ(·, ·) and ν(·, ·) satisfying (H6) as follows:
(i) Heterogeneous discounting: µ(t, T ) = e−λ1(T−t), ν(t, r) = e−λ2(r−t) with λ1, λ2 > 0, λ1 6= λ2. We
can let M(t) = e−λ1t, M(t, s) = e(λ2−λ1)t − e(λ2−λ1)s, N (T ) = 0, K(r) = e−λ2r.
(ii) Convex combination of two exponential discounting : µ(t, T ) = αe−λ1(T−t) + (1 − α)e−λ2(T−t),
ν(t, r) = αe−λ1(r−t)+(1−α)e−λ2(r−t), with α ∈ (0, 1), λ1, λ2 > 0, λ1 6= λ2. We can letM(t) = e−λ1t,
M(t, s) = e(λ2−λ1)t − e(λ2−λ1)s, N (T ) = (1− α)e−λ2T , K(r) = (1− α)e−λ2r.
(iii) Quasi-exponential discounting: µ(t, T ) =
(
1 + α(T − t)
)
e−λ(T−t), ν(t, r) =
(
1 + α(r − t)
)
e−λ(r−t),
with α, λ > 0. We can let M(t) = e−λt, M(t, s) = s− t, N (T ) = αe−λT , K(r) = αe−λr.
Under (H6), the equation (5.7) becomes
X¯(t) = ξ +
∫ t
τ
b¯(r, X¯(r), Y¯ (r), Z¯(r, r))dr +
∫ t
τ
σ(r, X¯(r))dW (r), t ∈ [τ, T ],
Y¯ (t) = µ(t, T )h0(T, X¯(T )) +
∫ T
t
[
ν(t, r)g0(r, X¯(r), Y¯ (r), Z¯(r, r)) + Z¯(t, r)α(r)
]
dr
−
∫ T
t
Z¯(t, r)dW (r), t ∈ [τ, T ].
(5.15)
For the above coupled SDE and BSVIE, we have the following well-posedness result.
Theorem 5.2. Let (H5) and (H6) hold. Then the coupled SDE and BSVIE (5.15) admits a unique
adapted solution.
Proof. The existence of the adapted solution to (5.15) is a combination of Theorem 4.2 and
Theorem 5.1. We only need to prove the uniqueness here. Let (X¯i(·), Y¯i(·), Z¯i(·, ·)); i = 1, 2 be two
adapted solutions to (5.15). By the uniqueness of BSVIE, there exist uniquely (yi(· , ·), zi(· , ·)); i = 1, 2
such that
yi(t, s) = µ(t, T )h0(T, X¯i(T )) +
∫ T
s
[
ν(t, r)g0(r, rX¯i(r), Y¯i(r), Z¯i(r, r)) + zi(t, r)α(r)
]
dr
−
∫ T
s
zi(t, r)dW (r), (t, s) ∈ ∆[τ, T ], i = 1, 2,
(5.16)
and
yi(t, t) = Y¯i(t), zi(t, s) = Z¯i(t, s), (t, s) ∈ ∆[τ, T ], i = 1, 2. (5.17)
For any t ∈ [τ, T ), multiplying the both side of BSVIE (5.16) by M(t), we have
M(t)yi(t, s) =M(t)µ(t, T )h0(T, X¯i(T )) +
∫ T
s
[
M(t)ν(t, r)g0(r, X¯i(r), yi(r, r), zi(r, r))
+M(t)zi(t, r)α(r)
]
dr −
∫ T
s
M(t)zi(t, r)dW (r), (t, s) ∈ ∆[τ, T ].
Let
X˜i(t) = X¯i(t), y˜i(t, s) =M(t)yi(t, s), z˜i(t, s) =M(t)zi(t, s), (t, s) ∈ ∆[τ, T ], (5.18)
then
y˜i(t, s) =M(t)µ(t, T )h0(T, X˜i(T )) +
∫ T
s
[
M(t)ν(t, r)g0
(
r, X˜i(r),M
−1(r)y˜i(r, r),M
−1(r)z˜i(r, r)
)
+ z˜i(t, r)α(r)
]
dr −
∫ T
s
z˜i(t, r)dW (r), (t, s) ∈ ∆[τ, T ].
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For any t′ ∈ [τ, T ), combining the above with (5.14),
(
y˜i(t, s) − y˜i(t′, s), z˜i(t, s)− z˜(t′, s)
)
; t ∨ t′ 6 s 6 T
satisfies
y˜i(t, s)− y˜i(t
′, s) =
[
M(t)µ(t, T )−M(t′)µ(t′, T )
]
h0(T, X˜i(T ))
+
∫ T
s
[[
M(t)v(t, r) −M(t′)v(t′, r)
]
g0
(
r, X˜i(r),M
−1(r)y˜i(r, r),M
−1(r)z˜i(r, r)
)
+
[
z˜i(t, r) − z˜i(t
′, r)
]
α(r)
]
dr −
∫ T
s
[
z˜i(t, r) − z˜i(t
′, r)
]
dW (r)
=M(t, t′)N (T )h0(T, X˜i(T ))
+
∫ T
s
[
M(t, t′)K(r)g0
(
r, X˜i(r),M
−1(r)y˜i(r, r),M
−1(r)z˜i(r, r)
)
+
[
z˜i(t, r) − z˜i(t
′, r)
]
α(r)
]
dr −
∫ T
s
[
z˜i(t, r) − z˜i(t
′, r)
]
dW (r).
Let (Ŷi(·), Ẑi(·)); i = 1, 2 be the unique solution to the following BSDE:
Ŷi(s) = N (T )h0(T, X˜i(T ))
+
∫ T
s
[
K(r)g0
(
r, X˜i(r),M
−1(r)y˜i(r, r),M
−1(r)z˜i(r, r)
)
+ Ẑi(r)α(r)
]
dr
−
∫ T
s
Ẑi(r)dW (r), s ∈ [τ, T ],
(5.19)
respectively. Multiplying the both side of BSDE (5.19) by M(t, t′),
(
M(t, t′)Ŷi(·),M(t, t′)Ẑi(·)
)
satisfies
M(t, t′)Ŷi(s) =M(t, t
′)N (T )h0(T, X˜i(T ))
+
∫ T
s
[
M(t, t′)K(r)g0
(
r, X˜i(r),M
−1(r)y˜i(r, r),M
−1(r)z˜i(r, r)
)
+M(t, t′)Ẑi(r)α(r)
]
dr
−
∫ T
s
M(t, t′)Ẑi(r)dW (r), s ∈ [t ∨ t
′, T ].
For the fixed t, t′, by the uniqueness of the adapted solution to the above BSDE, we have
y˜i(t, s)− y˜i(t
′, s) =M(t, t′)Ŷi(s), z˜i(t, s)− z˜i(t
′, s) =M(t, t′)Ẑi(s), s ∈ [t ∨ t
′, T ].
In particular, the following holds by taking t = s and t′ = τ ,
y˜i(s, s)− y˜i(τ, s) =M(s, τ)Ŷi(s), z˜i(s, s)− z˜i(τ, s) =M(s, τ)Ẑi(s). (5.20)
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Thus, (X˜i(·), y˜i(τ, ·), Ŷi(·), z˜i(τ, ·), Ẑi(·)) satisfies the following coupled FBSDEs:
X˜i(s) = ξ +
∫ s
τ
b¯
(
r, X˜i(r),M
−1(r)[y˜i(τ, r) +M(r, τ)Ŷi(r)],M
−1(r)[z˜i(τ, r) +M(r, τ)Ẑi(r)]
)
dr
+
∫ s
τ
σ(r, X˜i(r))dW (r), s ∈ [τ, T ],
y˜i(τ, s) =M(τ)µ(τ, T )h0(T, X˜i(T ))
+
∫ T
s
[
M(τ)v(τ, r)g0
(
r, X˜i(r),M
−1(r)
[
y˜i(τ, r) +M(r, τ)Ŷi(r)
]
,M−1(r)
[
z˜i(τ, r) +M(r, τ)Ẑi(r)
])
+ z˜i(τ, r)α(r)
]
dr −
∫ T
s
z˜i(τ, r)dW (r), s ∈ [τ, T ],
Yˆi(s) = N (T )h0(T, X˜i(T ))
+
∫ T
s
[
K(r)g0
(
r, X˜i(r),M
−1(r)
[
y˜i(τ, r) +M(r, τ)Ŷi(r)
]
,M−1(r)
[
Z˜i(τ, r) +M(r, τ)Ẑi(r)
])
+ Ẑi(r)α(r)
]
dr −
∫ T
s
Ẑi(r)dW (r), s ∈ [τ, T ].
By [24, Theorem 4.1], the above coupled FBSDEs admit a unique adapted solution. It follows that(
X˜1(·), y˜1(τ, ·), Ŷ1(·), z˜1(τ, ·), Ẑ1(·)
)
=
(
X˜2(·), y˜2(τ, ·), Ŷ2(·), z˜2(τ, ·), Ẑ2(·)
)
.
Combining this with (5.20), we have
y˜1(s, s) = y˜2(s, s), z˜1(s, s) = z˜2(s, s), s ∈ [τ, T ].
By the definition (5.18) of (X˜i(·), y˜i(·, ·), z˜i(·, ·)) and the relationship (5.17), we have
X¯1(s) = X¯2(s), Y¯1(s) = y1(s, s) = y2(s, s) = Y¯2(s),
Z¯1(s, s) = z1(s, s) = z2(s, s) = Z¯2(s, s), s ∈ [τ, T ].
(5.21)
Then (Y¯i(·), Z¯i(·, ·)) satisfies the following BSVIE:
Y¯i(t) = µ(t, T )h0(T, X¯(T )) +
∫ T
t
[
v(t, r)g0(r, X¯(r), Y¯ (r), Z¯(r, r)) + Z¯i(t, r)α(r)
]
dr
−
∫ T
s
Z¯i(t, r)dW (r), (t, s) ∈ ∆[τ, T ],
(5.22)
with X¯(s) , X¯1(s) ≡ X¯2(s), Y¯ (s) , Y¯1(s) ≡ Y¯2(s), Z¯(s, s) , Z¯1(s, s) ≡ Z¯2(s, s); s ∈ [τ, T ]. Note that
(5.22) is a classical BSVIE (without Z¯i(r, r)). By Lemma 2.1, we have
(Y¯1(·), Z¯1(·, ·)) = (Y¯2(·), Z¯2(·, ·)).
Combining the above with (5.21), the uniqueness of the adapted solution to the coupled FSDE and
BSVIE (5.15) is obtained.
Remark 5.3. Under (H5)–(H6), Theorem 5.2 establishes the well-posedness of the coupled SDE and
BSVIE (5.15), which is relevant to several important recursive optimal control problems with nonexpo-
nential discounting. The more general case (5.8) is still open. We hope to explore that in our future
publications.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this section, we are making some remarks to conclude this paper.
First of all, for recursive cost functional with nonexponential discounting, should one use parameter-
ized BSDEs as in [46, 43] or use BSVIE as in the current paper? For a stochastic optimal control problem,
a recursive cost functional, with exponential discounting, can be described by the adapted solution to
a BSDE. When the discounting is nonexponential, and/or the running cost rate and the terminal cost
are initial time dependent, then the recursive cost functional had better to use a BSVIE, instead of a
parameterized BSDE (as in [46, 43]). To be convincing, let us present a brief argument on that.
For any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D and control u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], let X(·) be the corresponding state process.
Motivated by the nonexponential discounting, one may consider the following cost functional
Ĵ(t, ξ;u(·)) = Et
[
h(t,X(T )) +
∫ T
t
g(t, s,X(s), u(s))ds
]
(6.1)
with suitable functions h(·) and g(·). If we let
y(t, s) = Es
[
h(t,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g(t, r,X(r), u(r))dr
]
, s ∈ [t, T ], (6.2)
then for some z(·, ·), the pair (y(·, ·), z(·, ·)) is the unique adapted solution to the following BSDE (with
parameter t):
y(t, s) = h(t,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g(t, r,X(r), u(r))dr −
∫ T
s
z(t, r)dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ], (6.3)
and
Ĵ(t, ξ;u(·)) = y(t, t).
Following the above idea and inspired by [11, 13, 43], to construct the recursive cost functional for the
state-control pair (X(·), u(·)), one might intuitively consider the following BSDE (with parameter t)
y(t, s) = h(t,X(T )) +
∫ T
s
g(t, r,X(r), u(r), y(t, r), z(t, r))dr −
∫ T
s
z(t, r)dW (r), r ∈ [t, T ], (6.4)
and define the cost functional by
Ĵ(t, ξ;u(·)) = y(t, t). (6.5)
But, taking s = t in (6.3), we obtain
y(t, t) = h(t,X(T )) +
∫ T
t
g(t, r,X(r), u(r), y(t, r), z(t, r))dr −
∫ T
t
z(t, r)dW (r), t ∈ [0, T ], (6.6)
which is not an equation for the process t 7→ y(t, t) since y(t, s) appears on the right-hand side of the
above. Further, since y(s, s) 6= y(t, s) in general, one finds that the dependence of current cost functional
value y(t, t) on the future cost functional values Ĵ(s,X(s);u(·)) = y(s, s); t < s 6 T seems not to be
valid. From this viewpoint, y(t, t) defined above seems not to be a good candidate of the recursive cost
functional with nonexponential discounting.
However, the above parameterized BSDE suggests us try to consider the following BSVIE:
Y (t) = h(t,X(T )) +
∫ T
t
g(t, r,X(r), u(r), Y (r), Z(t, r))dr −
∫ T
t
Z(t, r)dW (r), (6.7)
and define the cost functional by
J(t, ξ;u(·)) = Y (t), (6.8)
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as we have done in this paper. We know that under proper condition, the above BSVIE admits a
unique adapted solution (Y (·), Z(·, ·)) and process Y (·) is the most natural candidate for the recursive
cost functional with nonexponential discounting in the following sense: The current cost functional value
J(t, ξ;u(·)) = Y (t) really depends on the cost functional values J(r,X(r);u(·)) = Y (r) for r ∈ [t, T ],
through a BSIVE. Furthermore, such a recursive cost functional is time-consistent itself, in the following
sense: The future value of the cost functional predicted/calculated today will match the value of the cost
functional when that specific future time moment arrives. Some more detailed derivation and discussion
can be found in [37]. In a word, when we consider the stochastic optimal control problems with recursive
cost functional having generalized (nonexponential) discounting, BSVIE description should be a more
proper choice than the parameterized BSDE.
Now, let use make a direct comparison between the equilibrium HJB equations resulting from the
approach of [43] and the one of this paper. For convenience, we only consider the case that σ is independent
of control u. As in [43], if the recursive cost functional is taken to be (6.5), then the equilibrium HJB
equation reads
Θs(t, s, x) +
1
2
tr [Θxx(t, s, x)a(s, x)] + Θx(t, s, x)b
(
s, x, ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x))
)
+ g
(
t, s, x, ψ(s, s, x,Θ(s, s, x),Θx(s, s, x)),Θ(t, s, x),Θx(t, s, x)σ(s, x)
)
= 0,
(t, s, x) ∈ ∆[0, T ]× Rn,
Θ(t, T, x) = h(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
(6.9)
Comparing the above with (4.26), we see that Θ(t, s, x) in the above is replaced by Θ(s, s, x) in (4.26).
This is the main consequence of using BSVIE instead of parameterized BSDE. As we explained above, such
a replacement makes the problem more natural. On the other hand, from the mathematical viewpoint,
since Θ(s, s, x) has been appeared in ψ(·), regardless the above replacement, therefore, replacing Θ(t, s, x)
by Θ(s, s, x) mathematically reduces the complexity of the equation.
Next, in the current paper, by using the idea inspired by multi-person differential games ([46, 43])
and representation of adapted solutions to BSVIEs ([49, 40]), we obtain the equilibrium strategy for
Problem (N), which is time-consistent, locally near optimal, and it is determined by the solution to an
equilibrium HJB equation. We have seen that the equilibrium HJB equation in this paper is an interesting
modification of that found in [43].
Further, as a byproduct, in obtaining a Feynman-Kac type formula for the equilibrium HJB equation,
we introduce a new class of BSVIEs for which the diagonal value Z(s, s) of process Z(· , ·) appears. For
such kind of equations, some very special cases have been studied and the general case is left widely open.
Actually, our introduction in this paper initiates the research for such kind of BSVIEs. Some relevant
ideas and results for the so-called extended BSVIEs can be found in [35].
Finally, we provide a partial list of the widely open questions concerning our Problem (N):
• Solvability of general equilibrium HJB equation (3.63), with non-degenerate and bounded diffusion,
i.e.,
λ0I 6 σ(t, x, u)σ(t, x, u)
⊤ 6 λ1I.
• When σ(t, x, u) is degenerate (and it is independent of u), is it possible to use viscosity solution to
identify/characterize the equilibrium value function?
• If the map ψ defined by (3.12) is not regular enough, or not unique, or even does not exist, what
one can do for Problem (N)?
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